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Representation of the People Bill (Eighth sitting)

Debated on Thursday 16 April 2026

The Committee consisted of the following Members:

Chairs: Dr Rosena Allin-Khan, † Dame Siobhain McDonagh, David Mundell, Sir Desmond Swayne

† Baker, Alex (Aldershot) (Lab)

† Chowns, Dr Ellie (North Herefordshire) (Green)

Cocking, Lewis (Broxbourne) (Con)

† Costigan, Deirdre (Ealing Southall) (Lab)

† Dixon, Samantha (Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government)

† Franklin, Zöe (Guildford) (LD)

† Hatton, Lloyd (South Dorset) (Lab)

† Holmes, Paul (Hamble Valley) (Con)

† Joseph, Sojan (Ashford) (Lab)

Juss, Warinder (Wolverhampton West) (Lab)

† Kyrke-Smith, Laura (Aylesbury) (Lab)

† Lewin, Andrew (Welwyn Hatfield) (Lab)

† Murray, Katrina (Cumbernauld and Kirkintilloch) (Lab)

† Rushworth, Sam (Bishop Auckland) (Lab)

† Simmonds, David (Ruislip, Northwood and Pinner) (Con)

† Smart, Lisa (Hazel Grove) (LD)

† Yemm, Steve (Mansfield) (Lab)

Kevin Candy, Lucinda Maer, Ben Sneddon, Committee Clerks

† attended the Committee

Public Bill Committee

Thursday 16 April 2026

(Morning)

[Dame Siobhain McDonagh in the Chair]

Representation of the People Bill

Good morning. Could everyone ensure that electronic devices are turned off or switched to silent? We will continue line-by-line scrutiny of the Bill. The selection list for today’s sitting is available in the room and on the parliamentary website; this shows how the clauses, schedules and selected amendments have been grouped together for debate.

A reminder: a Member who has put their name to the lead amendment in a group is called to speak first, or, in the case of a stand part debate, the Minister will be called first. Other Members are then free to indicate that they wish to speak in the current debate by bobbing. At the end of the debate on a group of amendments and new clauses or schedules, I shall call the Member who moved the lead amendment or new clause again. Before they sit down, they will need to indicate whether they wish to withdraw the amendment or new clause, or to seek a decision. If any Member wishes to press any other amendment in a group—that includes grouped new clauses and schedules—to a vote, they need to let me know. The order of decisions follows the order in which amendments appear on the amendment paper.

Finally, for your information, the House’s official photographer will be present during this morning’s sitting—I hope you are all dressed in your best—in order to record the work of Hansard colleagues and to take some wide shots of the Committee in action. I hope no one has any objections.

Clause 70

Hostility towards officers and their staff

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 38, in clause 71, page 92, line 35, after “candidates,” insert “candidates’ relatives, candidates’ staff,”.

This amendment would, with NC55, include family members and staff of candidates as people towards whom hostility would be treated as an aggravating factor.

Clauses 71 to 74 stand part.

New clause 55—Hostility towards relatives and staff of candidates etc.

“(1) Part 5 of the Elections Act 2022 (disqualification of offenders for holding elective office etc.) is amended as follows.

(2) After section 32 (candidates etc.) insert—

‘32A Relatives and staff of candidates

(1) A person falls within this section if the person is—

(a) a relative; or

(b) a member of staff;

of a person described in section 32 (candidates etc.).

(2) For the purposes of subsection (1a) “relative” has the meaning given by section 63(1) of the Family Law Act 1996.

(3) For the purposes of subsection (1b) “member of staff” means a person who is employed by or working under the direction of a person described in section 32 (candidates etc.).’”

This new clause would, with Amendment 38, add relatives and staff of candidates to the persons against which hostility may lead to a disqualification order and for the purposes of a statutory aggravating factor.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Dame Siobhain. I will speak to clauses 70 to 74 first, and we will come to the amendments tabled by the Liberal Democrats later.

Harassment and intimidation of voters, electoral staff and campaigners, both online and in person, is unacceptable and has a profoundly detrimental impact on the UK’s democratic processes. We know that electoral staff faced unacceptable abuse and intimidation during the 2024 general election. That is why we are extending the scope of the disqualification order to ensure that electoral staff are provided with the same protection as candidates, campaigners and elective office holders.

Clause 70 will enhance the disqualification order’s ability to protect those who participate in public life, and those who play a crucial part in the administration and delivery of elections. It will also act as a deterrent, signalling that intimidatory behaviour is a serious matter that must not be allowed to damage our democracy.

It is clear that more must be done to tackle the abuse and intimidation directed at those who participate in elections and political debate. While disqualification orders are a key part of tackling the unacceptable harassment and intimidation of those in public life, they do nothing to prevent those who have no interest in standing as a candidate from engaging in intimidatory or abusive behaviour. Clause 71 introduces a new statutory aggravating factor, which will empower courts to apply an uplift when passing sentence for an offence linked to intimidation. This is where the offender was motivated by hostility towards candidates, campaigners, elective office holders and electoral officials and their staff.

Clause 72 introduces this new statutory aggravating factor in Northern Ireland, and amends the location of the pre-existing Scottish aggravating factor. This is a significant new deterrent for those who seek to damage the UK’s democracy or intimidate those who uphold it, and will ensure that anyone who does so will be subject to appropriate criminal justice penalties.

Let us turn to clause 73. Disqualification orders were introduced in the Elections Act 2022, to be imposed on offenders throughout the UK who commit crimes of hostility against electoral candidates, campaigners and officer holders. Scotland introduced Scottish disqualification orders in the Scottish Elections (Representation and Reform) Act 2025, which gave similar protection to a fourth category: Scottish electoral officials. The Bill extends the scope of the disqualification order in the Elections Act 2022 to protect electoral officials throughout the UK, but Scottish electoral officials will continue to be covered by the Scottish legislation.

To ensure that there is a fully reciprocal relationship between disqualification orders in Scotland and the rest of the UK, the Bill also applies the effect of Scottish disqualification orders to relevant elective offices throughout the UK. That ensures that if someone is disqualified from standing for or holding office in Scotland, they will also be unable to stand for or hold office in the rest of the UK, and vice versa.

That will ensure a consistent approach throughout the UK for intimidatory behaviour towards those who participate in public life. If a person is convicted of specific criminal offences, motivated by hostility towards candidates, future candidates, substitutes, nominees, campaigners, holders of relevant elective office or electoral officials, they will be prohibited from standing for or holding office for five years across the UK. Clause 74 builds on the measures introduced in clause73, and makes amendments to various pieces of legislation to apply the Scottish disqualification order to relevant elected offices across the UK.

Good morning, Dame Siobhain; it is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship. Thank you for the information about a photographer being present; had I known, I would have had a shave this morning. Normally, we can only be heard in audio and, as my mother says, I have a face that only a mother could love.

We welcome the Minister outlining the parameters of the clauses, and welcome the fact that the Government are taking the safety of election staff seriously. They are public facing, and work with us on an equal basis to ensure that democracy works. We therefore strongly welcome the fact that the Government are extending these protections to election staff. Officer teams across the whole country are very busy at the moment; we know that from our various involvements with election returning officers, and the election staff who are making sure that everybody who is entitled to vote can do so via different methods.

When an officer reads out the results on television, and faces an inquiry from somebody who they do not satisfy, that can spur on the kind of attacks and threats that we receive as publicly elected officials. It is therefore absolutely right that such officers should enjoy the same protections that we do. As I say, the Government should be congratulated on taking this matter seriously.

It therefore makes perfect sense to amend the sentencing code for England and Wales in clause 71 regarding offences that have been committed under the Elections Act 2022, so that going forward this can be treated as an aggravating factor. Of course, it is also perfectly sensible that the provisions apply to Northern Ireland, too.

We strongly welcome the Government’s action on this; it should be supported by everybody. I wanted to put it on the record that the Minister should be congratulated for it.

It was very good to hear from the Minister setting out this group of clauses. The Liberal Democrats are very pleased it seeks to address the hostility towards those who administer our elections. As colleagues on the Conservative Benches and the Minister have outlined, they play such an important part in our democracy.

Amendment 38 and new clause 55 in my name address the need for there also to be protection for the families and staff of candidates. I was a member of the Speaker’s Conference, and I would like to put it on record how pleased I am to see so many of its recommendations in the Bill. We considered in quite some depth the issue of abuse of candidates.

The survey of MPs and their staff highlighted the nature of the abuse and intimidation they experience, and the sad reality that it is not limited to them. Rather, where a bad actor is unsuccessful or unable to silence the candidate directly, they turn to the people around them. That can be partners, children or staff. We firmly believe that should not be deemed to be okay in the eyes of the law, and that it needs to be addressed.

New clause 55 amends the Elections Act 2022 so that relatives and staff of candidates are a protected category for the purposes of hostility-based disqualification and related provisions, defining “relative” by reference to the Family Law Act 1996, and “staff” as people

“employed by or working under the direction”

of a candidate. Amendment 38 amends clause 71 of the Bill to include candidates’ relatives and staff in the list for the hostility aggravating factor.

I hope that the Minister and the Government will support those important provisions. If they do not, could the Minister please outline how the Bill as drafted already covers candidates’ relatives and staff, or what the justification is for leaving such a gap?

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Dame Siobhain. I rise briefly to say that I fully support these measures, which are clearly welcomed across all parties. I also support the comments of the hon. Member for Guildford in relation to extending the measures further, because by definition, anybody who is essentially associated with the political process is potentially subject to the hostility that we have discussed. Extending those protections is clearly important.

Those who are convicted of relevant offences motivated by hostility against a candidate, campaigner or elective office holder can be banned from standing for or holding elective office for five years. As I have set out, the Bill will also introduce a new aggravating factor for those same offences and extend the regime to include relevant offences motivated by hostility against electoral staff.

Amendment 38 and new clause 55 would extend the list of relevant persons to include candidates’ staff and their relatives. I am pleased to inform the Committee that the regime already covers those circumstances. The application of the existing disqualification order and new aggravating factor is based on the motivation behind the offence committed, regardless of precisely who the offence was committed against. For example, if it were found that a relevant offence was committed against a candidate’s relative for the purpose of intimidating the candidate, ultimately the offence was motivated by hostility towards the candidate, and thus a disqualification order or aggravating factor could be applied.

Regarding employees of candidates specifically, I draw the attention of the hon. Member for Guildford to the fact that campaigners employed by candidates are already directly protected under the regime by section 34 of the Elections Act 2022. Other employees would be covered indirectly in the same way that I have outlined for a candidate’s relatives. I hope the hon. Member is reassured by that and will consider not pressing the amendment.

New clause 55 would require the Electoral Commission to publish and maintain guidance relating to candidate safety and security. It would also require returning officers to provide that guidance to candidates as soon as their nomination has been confirmed. We are highly sympathetic to the goal of the new clause, and this is reflected in ongoing workstreams and measures already included in the Bill.

The Government and the Electoral Commission already have significant work under way in this area. The joint election security and preparedness unit—JESP—is a permanent function dedicated to co-ordinating security and preparedness work ahead of electoral events. Prior to each election, JESP leads a comprehensive programme of work to ensure that candidates and election officials have the resources they need to feel safe and secure during the election, including updating security guidance for candidates and returning officers, and supporting returning officers to understand the support available to them at key potential flashpoints, such as polling stations.

Specifically ahead of the forthcoming May 2026 elections that are happening across England, Scotland and Wales, updated candidate security guidance was sent to returning officers and political parties in England and Wales. These were distributed to candidates in early January—earlier than in previous years—to support parties to use the guidance in wider candidate training. Police Scotland has issued guidance to candidates standing for election to the Scottish Parliament.

The comprehensive Government guidance now covers how candidates should interact with Operation Ford, the personal security measures they should adopt, cyber-security services available to them, and reporting online abuse to platforms. The updated guidance also includes a link to the National Protective Security Authority’s counter political interference and espionage plan.

The Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government has also hosted webinars for returning officers and electoral service managers in England, Wales and Scotland to highlight the Government’s security offer across physical, cyber and information threats. On the role of the Electoral Commission specifically, it already regularly provides and updates guidance to candidates and returning officers. The commission has updated its election security guidance for returning officers, and the wider gov.uk page has been updated, too.

In partnership with the National Police Chiefs’ Council, the Crown Prosecution Service and the College of Policing, the Electoral Commission has also issued joint guidance specifically on harassment and intimidation. However, we recognise that more can be done, and that is why we are also working with the Electoral Commission and the Speaker’s Conference to develop an updated code of conduct for campaigning and improved safety guidance for returning officers and candidates.

The Government, through the Bill, will also make provision for candidates to complete an optional additional form when completing their nomination papers. The purpose of this additional form is to allow candidates to provide their contact details to the returning officer for the specific purpose of the returning officer then sharing those details with local policing. Once local policing has this information, the relevant force’s elected official adviser will then make contact and arrange relevant security briefings for those candidates. I encourage all candidates, through Members on this Committee and in the wider House, to take up the offer of a security briefing at the earliest opportunity.

On new clause 55 and amendment 38, I understand why the hon. Member for Guildford, the Liberal Democrat spokesperson, is attempting to change the legislation.

The Minister may remember that we had a back-and-forth in relation to the security briefings being offered to candidates through Operation Ford, and the Government’s amendments. Has she given any more thought to a statutory timeline, and guidance on making sure that candidates are offered those briefings in a reasonable timeframe so that nobody slips through the net because the police force has not got around to it? That may inform the decision of the hon. Member for Guildford regarding whether to press the new clause and amendment to a vote.

The Government’s view is that the Electoral Commission is working hard, and that to prescribe timetables would place a restriction on it that we do not feel is required. Given the good, proactive work that it already does in this area, with the Government working alongside it, we do not feel it necessary to place a statutory duty on the Electoral Commission. With JESP, the Department and the Electoral Commission working hard across the electoral landscape, we do not feel that the amendment and the new clause are necessary, so I respectfully ask the hon. Member not to push them to a vote.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 70 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 71 to 74 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

New Clause 14

Removal of strategy and policy statement

“(1) In Part 1 of PPERA 2000 (the Electoral Commission) omit—

(a) sections 4A to 4E and the italic heading before those sections (strategy and policy statement);

(b) section 13ZA and the italic heading before that section (examination by the Speaker’s Committee of the Electoral Commission’s performance of duty to have regard to strategy and policy statement).

(2) Omit sections 16 and 17(1) of the Elections Act 2022 (which inserted the sections repealed by subsection (1)).

(3) The Electoral Commission is not required to publish a report under section 4B(4) of PPERA 2000 in relation to any 12-month period ending on or after the day on which this section comes into force.”—(Samantha Dixon.)

This new clause removes provision about the designation of a strategy and policy statement for the Electoral Commission.

Brought up, and read the First time.

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

The new clause removes provisions allowing the designation of a strategy and policy statement for the Electoral Commission. For the health of our democracy, it is essential that the Electoral Commission is fearlessly independent, commands trust across the political spectrum and the public, and is seen to operate free from political influence. We have listened to stakeholders and recognise that re-establishing the principle of independence for our elections regulator is vital for public confidence in our electoral system.

That move is a response to the recommendations of the Ethics and Integrity Commission, parliamentary Committees, the Electoral Commission itself as well as civil society organisations such as Transparency International and Spotlight on Corruption, all of whom emphasised that Government powers to designate a statement are incompatible with the commission’s independence.

That is why we have taken clear action by tabling this new clause. Ministers will no longer have the power to designate a strategy and policy statement, and the Electoral Commission will no longer be required to have regard to one. The Electoral Commission will rightly remain accountable to Parliament through the Speaker’s Committee. The new clause would reinforce the foundational principles of the Electoral Commission’s independence, and it would restore confidence in its ability to oversee elections and regulate political finance, without fear or favour, into the future. For that reason, I urge Members to accept the new clause.

I thank the hon. Lady very much.

Question put and agreed to.

New clause 14 accordingly read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 60

Power of Scottish Ministers to vary sums in Schedule 7 to PPERA 2000

“In section 155 of PPERA 2000 (power to vary specified sums or percentages), in subsection (1A)—

(a) after ‘vary’ insert ‘—

(a) ’;

(b) at the end insert

‘, or

(b) any sum for the time being specified in Schedule 7 so far as that sum applies in relation to a donation to a member of a local authority in Scotland who is not also a member of a registered party.’”—(Samantha Dixon.)

This new clause, which would be inserted after clause 62, amends section 155(1A) of the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000 to provide a power for the Scottish Ministers to vary the sums in Schedule 7 (control of donations to individuals and member associations), so far as they relate to areas of devolved competence.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 2

Permissible donors not to include individuals serving a foreign administration

“(1) Section 54 of PPERA 2000 (permissible donors) is amended as follows.

(2) After subsection (2) insert—

‘(2A) An individual who would otherwise fall within subsection (2)(a) is not a permissible donor if that individual is, or has been—

(a) a member of, or

(b) a politically-appointed adviser to

a foreign administration.’

(3) After subsection (8) insert—

‘(9) In subsection (2A)—

“foreign administration” means the government or state apparatus of any country or territory outside the United Kingdom;

“member” includes elected and appointed members.’”—(Lisa Smart.)

This new clause would ban those who are or have been members of a foreign administration, or advisers to a foreign administration, from donating money to a political party, think tank or campaigning body.

Brought up, and read the First time.

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

New clause 3—Permissible donors not to include persons who have promoted political violence

“(1) Section 54 of PPERA 2000 (permissible donors) is amended as follows.

(2) After subsection (3ZB) insert—

‘(3ZC) A person is not to be treated as a permissible donor in relation to a donation if the person has been convicted of a prescribed offence relating to the promotion, incitement, or use of political violence.

(3ZD) The Secretary of State must by regulations prescribe the offences which fall within subsection (3ZC).’”

New clause 15—Declaration of income or gifts from Foreign Governments

“(1) Schedule 1 to RPA 1983 (parliamentary elections rules) is amended as follows.

(2) After rule 8 (consent to nomination) insert—

‘Declaration of income or gifts from Foreign Governments

8A (1) A person is not validly nominated unless the person makes a declaration stating whether they have received in the past or are currently in receipt of any income or gifts from—

(a) the government of any foreign nation, or

(b) any person or organisation connected to the government of any foreign nation.

(2) The declaration must be—

(a) in the prescribed form,

(b) signed by the person, and

(c) delivered at the place and within the time for the delivery of nomination papers.

(3) For the purposes of this rule, a person or organisation connected to the government of any foreign nation mean anyone who has at anytime been—

(a) a member of, or

(b) a politically-appointed adviser to a foreign administration.’

(3) In rule 6A (nomination papers: name of registered political party), at the end insert—

‘(4) A registered political party is under a duty to ensure that a candidate has made the declaration required by rule 8A, and a certificate under paragraph (1) or (1B) may not be issued by or on behalf of the registered nominating officer of the party in respect of a candidate unless this duty has been discharged.’”

This new clause would require candidates to declare any income or gifts from foreign nations or connected entities in order to be validly nominated. It also places a duty on political parties to ensure their candidates have made this declaration before authorising them to stand on behalf of the party.

New clause 16—Annual statements on foreign donation risks and independent investigations

“(1) Part 4 of PPERA 2000 (control of donations to registered parties and their members etc) is amended as follows.

(2) After section 66 (Declaration by treasurer in donation report) insert—

‘66A Annual statement on mitigation of foreign donation risks

(1) The treasurer of a registered party must, in respect of each calendar year, prepare a statement setting out the steps taken by the party to mitigate risks relating to donations originating from a foreign nation.

(2) The statement must be delivered to the Commission alongside the party's statement of accounts for that year.

66B Annual independent investigation of donations by foreign-owned UK entities

(1) A registered party must, in respect of each calendar year, arrange for an independent investigation to be conducted into any donations received by the party from a foreign-owned UK entity.

(2) A report of the independent investigation must be submitted to the Commission by the treasurer of the party within six months of the end of the calendar year to which it relates.

(3) The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision about—

(a) the appointment and qualifications of an independent investigator for the purposes of this section;

(b) the definition of a “foreign-owned UK entity”; and

(c) the required contents of the investigation report.

(4) Regulations under subsection (3) are subject to the affirmative resolution procedure.’”

This new clause requires registered political parties to produce an annual statement detailing how they have mitigated risks relating to donations from foreign nations. It also requires parties to commission an annual independent investigation into donations they receive from foreign-owned UK entities, with the findings submitted to the Electoral Commission.

New clause 17—Payments from foreign state broadcasters to politicians and candidates

“(1) Schedule 7 to PPERA 2000 (control of donations to individuals and members associations) is amended as set out in subsection (2).

(2) After paragraph 6 insert—

‘Prohibition on payments from foreign state broadcasters

6A (1) A regulated donor must not accept any payment, remuneration or other financial benefit, whether or not on commercial terms, from a prescribed foreign state broadcaster.

(2) The Secretary of State may by regulations proscribe a foreign state broadcaster for the purposes of this paragraph where the Secretary of State considers the broadcaster is acting on behalf of, or producing propaganda for, a foreign power.

(3) For the purposes of this paragraph, a payment or benefit includes, but is not limited to, remuneration for appearing on, hosting, or contributing to broadcasts or programmes.’

(3) Schedule 1 to RPA 1983 (parliamentary elections rules) is amended as set out in subsection (4).

(4) After rule 8 (consent to nomination) insert—

‘Declaration of past earnings from foreign state broadcasters

8A (1) A person is not validly nominated unless the person makes a declaration stating whether they have received any past or current earnings, payments or benefits from a foreign state broadcaster prescribed under paragraph 6A of Schedule 7 to the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000.

(2) The declaration must be—

(a) in the prescribed form,

(b) signed by the person, and

(c) delivered at the place and within the time for the delivery of nomination papers.’”

This new clause prohibits politicians (regulated donors) from receiving any payment from prescribed foreign state broadcasters. It also amends the parliamentary election rules to require candidates (including incumbent MPs) to formally declare any past earnings from these entities in order to be validly nominated to stand for election.

New clause 38—Permissible donors: foreign citizens

“(1) PPERA 2000 is amended as follows.

(2) In Section 54 after paragraph (2) insert—

‘(2AA) For the purposes of this section, subject to the exemptions in section (2AB), an “individual registered in an electoral register” does not include a person who is on a register by virtue of being a “qualifying foreign citizen” for the purposes of—

(a) Section 2 of the Local Government and Elections (Wales) Act 2021, or

(b) Section 1 of the Scottish Elections (Franchise and Representation) Act 2020.

(2AB) The exemptions in this subsection are that the person is on an electoral register because they are—

(a) a qualified Commonwealth citizen,

(b) a citizen of the Republic of Ireland, or

(c) a citizen of the European Union who would be eligible to vote in local elections under the English and Northern Ireland franchise.’”

This new clause prevents people who are on electoral registers because they fulfil certain conditions in the Local Government and Elections (Wales) Act 2021 and the Scottish Elections (Franchise and Representation) Act 2020 from being permissible donors but are not qualifying Commonwealth, Irish, or EU citizens.

New clause 39—Mitigating the risk of foreign interference in political donations

“Within six months of the passing of this Act, the Secretary of State must publish a consultation paper on how Government will enhance information-sharing between relevant agencies and public bodies and registered political parties to help to identify and mitigate the risk of foreign interference in political donations that are regulated by electoral law.”

This new clause would require the Secretary of State to consult on how to enhance information sharing between relevant public bodies or agencies and political parties to minimise the risk of foreign interference in political donations.

New clause 45—Permissible electors to include overseas electors with previous tax residence etc

“(1) Section 54 of the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000 (permissible donors) is amended as follows.

(2) In subsection (2)(a), at end insert ‘(but this is subject to subsection (2ZA))’.

(3) After subsection (2) insert—

‘(2ZA) An individual registered in an electoral register who at the date of a donation qualifies as an overseas elector in respect of a constituency is only a permissible donor for the purposes of this Part if—

(a) the individual was at any time resident in the UK for tax purposes,

(b) the individual has a Unique Taxpayer Reference, and

(c) the individual holds funds or assets that may be charged to tax in the United Kingdom that are at least equivalent to the value of the donation.

(2ZB) For the purposes of subsection (2ZA)—

(a) whether a person qualifies as an overseas elector is to be determined in accordance with section 1A of the Representation of the People Act 1985;

(b) whether a person was at any time resident in the UK for tax purposes is to be determined in accordance with Schedule 45 to the Finance Act 2013.’”

This new clause limits permissible donors who are overseas electors to those who have previously been resident in the UK for tax purposes, have a Unique Taxpayer Reference and holds funds or assets that may be taxed in the UK which have a value of at least the amount to be donated.

New clause 51—Annual report regarding foreign interference in political funding

“(1) The Electoral Commission and the National Crime Agency must each produce and publish an annual report about—

(a) the risk of foreign interference in relation to controlled donations, and

(b) the adequacy of any systems designed to address risks of foreign interference in relation to controlled donations.

(2) The Electoral Commission and the National Crime Agency must send a copy of the report to the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of State must lay it before Parliament.

(3) In this section—

‘controlled donation’ means—

(i) a donation to a registered party, individual or members association that is subject to Part 4 of the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000, and

(ii) a donation to a candidate or their agent that is subject to Schedule 2A of the Representation of the People Act 1983;

‘foreign interference’ includes the commission of a relevant electoral offence to which section 16 of the National Security Act 2023 applies (foreign interference in elections).”

This new clause would require the Electoral Commission and the National Crime Agency to make annual reports about the risks of foreign interference in the UK’s political finance system and the adequacy of systems in place to address those risks.

It is a pleasure to serve with you in the Chair, Dame Siobhain. Trust in our democracy is not something that we can afford to take for granted; it is earned, and it is increasingly fragile. Years of scandals, sleaze and foreign money flooding into our politics have eroded that trust, and we must act to restore it. My new clauses are designed to restore transparency to our democracy, and to restore that trust.

New clause 2 would ban anyone who is or has been a member of, or a politically appointed advisor to, a foreign Administration from donating to a political party, think-tank or campaigning body. If a person has served in a foreign state in a political capacity, they should not be able to use their personal wealth to shape British politics—that is the reason behind the new clause. The resulting risk of strong potential conflicts of interest, and of foreign influence by proxy, is self-evident. The current permissible donor rules focus on nationality and residency; they do not ask whether a UK-registered donor has served a foreign Government in a political role, which is a gap that a determined adversary could drive a coach and horses through.

The Liberal Democrats have long called for reforms to prevent foreign interference and increased transparency in political donations. We believe that protecting democracy is a national security policy priority. If Ministers are serious about closing the loopholes that exist, which allow foreign and dark money to shape British politics, they will welcome new clause 2.

New clause 3 would prevent anyone who

“has been convicted of a prescribed offence relating to the promotion, incitement, or use of political violence”

from making donations to political parties. It is a straightforward proposition: those who have sought to undermine democracy through violence should have no financial role in shaping it. We firmly hold the principle that our democratic institutions must command public confidence and that those who have sought to undermine them should face serious consequences. Certain terrorism and national security offences should be treated as a special case to maintain confidence in our democratic institutions. It is right to protect the integrity of those institutions against those who seek to undermine them through violence and extremism.

I completely support the thrust of these new clauses tabled by the hon. Member, in terms of protecting British democracy. I have a specific question in relation to new clause 3. Last year the Government proscribed a protest organisation. That proscription has since been overturned in the High Court, and it is still being considered. Is the hon. Member concerned about her new clause might interact with that particular case? Is there a case for thinking carefully about that issue?

I am grateful to the hon. Member for giving me the opportunity to wade into such a thorny political issue—and an issue where it is important to stay on the right side of what can be said in discussing a proscribed organisation. The Government should use their powers of proscription proportionately, in all cases, and should be able to robustly back up their decision to proscribe an organisation with very clear evidence that is made public. I am on the record many times as saying that.

The police and any authorities that we are asking to implement the law must do so according to the law as it is at the time. At the moment there is a live case where an organisation was proscribed and there are relevant court cases. The hon. Member is absolutely right to highlight that. Over the weekend, arrests were made in relation to that proscription. New clause 3 is about donations to political parties. If an organisation is proscribed—and it is still proscribed—it would fall under the scope of new clause 3, even if there are ongoing legal processes that have not yet concluded.

Just to be clear, my concern is that literally hundreds of people have been arrested for holding placards in relation to that organisation. Potentially, under the hon. Member’s new clause 3, all those hundreds of people could be forbidden forever from donating to any political party. I am not sure that that is proportionate. It strikes me that there is complexity there, relating to the specific new clause. I am fully on board with excluding promotion of political violence and so forth, but that particular case highlights a complexity, particularly around the hundreds of people arrested for holding placards.

The arrests were made for support for a proscribed organisation via holding a placard that said the holder supports that organisation. I think we are talking about the same case. I understand the point that the hon. Member makes. Proscription of organisations is a tool that the Government rightly uses, although I have questioned the proportionality of the use of that tool. New clause 3 particularly mentions political violence; the hon. Member is talking about peaceful protest, if I understand her correctly. All hon. Members on this Committee, and everyone beyond it, should support the right for people to tell a Government that they think the Government have got it wrong. We should all support that and not make it harder for people to do it. If, however, someone is guilty of a

“prescribed offence relating to the promotion, incitement, or use of political violence”,

I do not think that they should be able to financially support a political party. The promotion of an organisation is the same as supporting an organisation. There are ways of supporting organisations and causes that stay exactly the right side of the law. While I am not of the view that the Government have always used proscription rules proportionately in recent months, I do think that, if those rules exist, they should be able to be used in that way by those who are enforcing the law.

I am sympathetic to the point that the hon. Member is trying to make. I have listened carefully to what she said about new clauses 2 and 3. With respect to new clause 3, it would be helpful to consider the treatment of those who may have been opponents of an oppressive foreign political regime who have been convicted in this country of an offence that might be a proscribed offence under mutual recognition arrangements, but where they perhaps sought asylum in the UK. We have seen examples of people who were vocal opponents of the Putin regime in Russia coming to the UK and joining a political party. Those are people who we recognise as good citizens. How would they be treated should that offence be on that proscribed list?

In respect to new clause 2, again, I have sympathy, but I raise the issue of business people undertaking consular roles in other countries. It is quite common, for example, for a British business person who may be the British consul in a particular town to then be appointed by a series of other Governments to act for them as an agent in that respect. Subsequently, on returning to the UK that business person would be caught by the rules in new clause 2, even though those restrictions are in no way intended to target those types of activities. Has the hon. Member given some thought to how those types of roles would be captured and how they might be excluded?

New clause 3 talks specifically about political violence. While we can sometimes agree with the message that opponents of our adversaries use, it is right that we are against political violence and those who promote political violence. I think that covers his question on new clause 3.

There are some people who renounce political violence— Nelson Mandela comes to mind. Obviously, he was never a British citizen, but there is a genuine question there.

We should all be against political violence. People who propose and promote political violence should not be permitted to donate to political parties in the UK. I am thinking about people who have various convictions in the UK for promoting political violence and about people who own tech platforms but are based on the west coast of the United States and have spoken at rallies that promote political violence. We should not be welcoming their interference in our politics and new clause 3 seeks to stop them from doing so.

On new clause 2, the hon. Member for Ruislip, Northwood and Pinner talked about people who have been politically appointed to be an adviser for a foreign Administration, whether in a business ambassadorial or trade envoy role, and I see his point. I would have thought those are politically appointed, rather than on a civil service basis. However, there are people who are not political appointments who would not fall within new clause 2, so they could continue to operate both as an envoy or an ambassador in that informal business ambassadorial role and continue to donate. I do not think that is covered under new clause 2 as it is currently written.

Returning to new clause 3, the principle that our democratic institutions must command public confidence, and that those who seek to undermine them should face serious consequences, is one that we hold firmly.

On new clause 15, voters have a right to know who is financing the people seeking their vote. That is a basic condition of democratic accountability. Real-time disclosure of donations in a publicly searchable database of all online political ads and spending are commitments we have held for years. New clause 15 is entirely consistent with that agenda. There have been other amendments and proposals from other Members that have touched on some of those issues, which we also support.

New clause 16 would require the treasurer of each registered political party to prepare an annual statement setting out the steps taken to mitigate risks relating to donations originating from a foreign nation, to be delivered to the Electoral Commission alongside the party’s statement of accounts. We have heard a great deal throughout this Committee about the importance of transparency, and we agree.

This new clause makes transparency operational. It requires parties not simply to accept or reject donations, but to demonstrate annually that they have actively assessed and mitigated the risks of foreign money entering their finances through UK-registered vehicles. Foreign-owned UK entities are a known vector for influence. The public record of recent years—Russian money, oligarch links and opaque corporate structures—makes that plain. An independent annual audit is a proportionate and practical response.

New clause 17 is about prohibiting politicians from receiving payment from proscribed state broadcasters. State-controlled broadcasters have been used as instruments of foreign influence, disinformation and political interference for decades. It would be extraordinary to allow individuals seeking or holding elected office to receive financial benefit from those very organisations. That is not a blanket ban on media appearances—heaven forbid—it is a prohibition on financial relationships with broadcasters acting as foreign propaganda arms.

Moving on to new clauses 45 and 51 proposed by the hon. Member for Warwick and Leamington (Matt Western), the Joint Committee that he chairs noted potential risks around permissible donors being used as “conduits” to channel foreign money into UK politics. It further noted a discrepancy between corporations needing to have a UK connection—for example, generating enough revenue in the UK to cover their donation—and individuals, for whom there were apparently fewer such requirements. The report considered various options, balancing security interests against the risk of creating chilling effects.

New clause 45 would mean that overseas individuals wishing to donate would need to hold funds or assets that may be taxed in the UK, sufficient to cover the cost of their donation. That broadly mirrors the Government’s proposals for corporations to have generated sufficient UK-based revenue.

On new clause 51, the Joint Committee’s report also highlighted the resourcing challenges faced by the Electoral Commission and law enforcement bodies such as the National Crime Agency, and noted that legislative changes will be effective only if there is adequate resourcing to enforce the rules. New clause 51 would require the Electoral Commission and the National Crime Agency to report annually on the risks of foreign interference in the UK’s political finance system and the adequacy of systems in place to address those risks.

I rise to speak briefly to Opposition new clauses 38 and 39 in my name. They are proportionate measures to enhance the legislation and assist the Government in their aim of tightening up on foreign political donations.

New clause 38 would prevent people who are on electoral registers because they fulfil certain conditions in the Local Government and Elections (Wales) Act 2021 and the Scottish Elections (Franchise and Representation) Act 2020, but are not qualifying Commonwealth citizens, from being permissible donors. We have tabled it because we are concerned that modern changes to devolved legislation have created loopholes in who can give money from foreign origins.

The Labour Government in Wales have given all foreigners the right to vote in local and devolved elections. The SNP Scottish Government have done the same in Scotland. Those Administrations have made those changes through section 2 of the Local Government and Elections (Wales) Act and section 1 of the Scottish Elections (Franchise and Representation) Act.

Such legislation has also given foreign residents the right to make unlimited donations to UK politicians and political parties. We contend that that opens the door to Russian, Chinese and Iranian foreign influence. For example, a Chinese “student” resident at a Scottish university can legally make political donations to any UK political entity. We have raised that issue in Parliament, but the current Government have declined to address it. The new clause would essentially ban that from happening, except where a person is a Commonwealth, Irish or EU citizen, as we believe those historical links are much more in keeping with the current electoral guidelines and legislation.

Through new clause 39, we are trying to help the Government get to the place I think they eventually want to reach: increased information-sharing on the sources of donations, particularly to minimise the risk of foreign influence—I have absolutely no doubt that is the Government’s aim. In fact, one of the key recommendations in the Rycroft review is having a centre of excellence to ensure that data and information are shared between the necessary organisations, but we do not think the Government are there yet. Indeed, the Rycroft review, as we have said a significant number of times, is running in parallel to this legislative process, and we do not currently see information-sharing that would necessarily allow the identification of foreign influence by organisations such as the police or the intelligence services.

We do not have a principled objection to greater information-sharing, as I have just outlined. For example, we would argue that the Electoral Commission has already been given new powers to access Companies House information under the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act 2023, although the regulators chosen should obviously be relevant to the enforcement of political finance legislation. However, we would argue that information-sharing should go both ways.

That is why the last Conservative Government, during the parliamentary stages of the National Security Act 2023, committed to look at greater information-sharing powers between relevant agencies and political parties to help to identify irregular sources. It is disappointing that the current Administration has so far not implemented those changes, which are important for the implementation of the “Know Your Customer” checks.

We are trying to steer the Government in the right way on this issue. As I have said repeatedly, the Rycroft review is a huge opportunity to really tackle foreign interference in our electoral process. Actually, the cost of foreign interference on the British political system is very cheap, compared with the United States or other countries—it perhaps takes only a couple of thousand pounds to influence a Member of Parliament into taking up a case. I am really concerned that, with the Bill potentially being such a landmark piece of legislation that makes real changes in foreign interference, the Government have not grasped that or taken up that mantle enough to make those solid changes.

We would argue that new clause 39 is a first step. However, if the Government legislate retrospectively to bring in the recommendations of the Rycroft review, particularly on having a centre of excellence and information-sharing—I look to the Minister to reassure us with an indication of how she might do that—it may shape our view on new clause 39. I hope she will see the intention behind enhancing that information-sharing.

At the moment, we see a blindingly obvious loophole in identification, and we want to ensure that all organisations have a level playing field and a statutory ability to communicate with each other, so that we can highlight any potential or ongoing attempt at foreign influence in our political process. I look forward to the Minister’s response to those concerns.

The Government fully recognise the seriousness of the threat posed by foreign interference in our democracy. Protecting the integrity of UK elections is essential, which is why it is a criminal offence to accept or facilitate donations from foreign sources, and why the Bill seeks to strengthen the system further. However, while I can understand and appreciate the intention behind new clause 2, we do not believe that it is the right way to address this threat.

First, new clause 2 takes a broad and untargeted approach that would permanently bar any individual who

“is, or has been…a member of, or…adviser to a foreign administration”

from making political donations, regardless of how long ago that role was held, its nature or whether there is any ongoing connection to a foreign state. That risks excluding individuals who are entitled to participate in UK political life, and who pose no credible risk of foreign interference.

Secondly, there would be issues of enforceability. I will not spend much time on this particular point, because it is important that I set out our arguments on the principle, and what I think the right answer to this is, but following the approach of new clause 2 would mean relying on definitions of persons that are difficult to get right and can be unenforceable in practice. The amendment relies on concepts such as a “politically-appointed adviser”, which is opaque, legally speaking, and risks creating legal uncertainty for campaigners and regulators.

Thirdly, and more fundamentally, where the concern is hostile activity by, or on behalf of, foreign states, we already have robust and targeted tools in our national security legislation, which is complemented by safeguards in electoral law that we are seeking to enhance through the Bill. The National Security Act 2023 provides a clear criminal framework for tackling hostile state activity, including the foreign interference offence, which is specifically designed to capture conduct carried out on behalf of a foreign power to influence the UK’s political system.

Existing electoral law is designed to ensure that money can only come from permissible sources and criminalises the acceptance or facilitation of donations from impermissible foreign sources. The Bill significantly strengthens the existing rules so that in future even donations that are potentially risky are identified earlier, scrutinised more closely, and returned where necessary.

By introducing robust “know your donor” checks and requiring all donors to declare any benefits they have received in connection with their donation, we are reducing the space in which individuals who pose a real risk, or their proxies, can operate under the radar. Our new measures directly respond to the concerns raised by the hon. Member for Hazel Grove, as well as those of other key stakeholders, such as the Electoral Commission, the Committee on Standards in Public Life and the National Crime Agency. With that, I hope she feels she can withdraw her amendment.

New clause 3 seeks to prevent those convicted of a prescribed offence relating to the promotion, incitement, or use of political violence from making political donations. Currently, if an individual is convicted of such an offence, that conduct rightly affects their democratic rights, including their ability to stand for election or to hold elected office. This helps to deter those who would undermine the democratic rights of others, such as candidates contesting an election.

The Government are absolutely aligned with the intention behind this proposal. Political violence and its promotion or incitement have no place in our democracy, and we are clear that those who seek to undermine democratic participation through violence or intimidation should face serious consequences. The question, however, is not whether this behaviour is unacceptable—it plainly is—but whether this is the right legal mechanism to address it.

If this amendment were to be accepted, it would represent a significant shift in the purpose of political finance law, which is about ensuring only those individuals who have a legitimate interest in our elections can support candidates and campaigns through their vote, volunteering their time or offering financial support. Although I share the hon. Member’s concern, the Government believe that this amendment does not address a regulatory gap and would not further our shared aim of reducing harassment and intimidation in politics.

The harassment and intimidation of voters, electoral staff and campaigners is unacceptable and has a profoundly detrimental impact on our democracy. That is why we are taking forward several interventions in the Bill to tackle this issue, which we have already discussed in great detail, and are doing so through criminal law, electoral offences and disqualification, rather than through political finance rules, which are not designed to address conduct. With those reassurances, I hope the hon. Member will withdraw her amendment.

I listened closely to what the Minister said, and I understand the thrust of her view that existing rules would cover the conduct that we are seeking to avoid. Will the Minister think of the specific case of Elon Musk, the owner of X? He spoke at a rally via video link and incited violence. He has also talked, at separate times, about donating to a UK political party. UK companies are part of his group; there would be a way for him to channel funding through a UK company. Will the Minister let me know what I am missing that would stop Elon Musk doing that?

I have said this before and I will say it again: the Bill is not designed to prevent specific individuals from participating in or undermining elections. It is about the general regulatory framework and criminal law that we intend to implement, uphold and shore up to prevent certain behaviours in the future. It is not about specific individuals, so I decline to respond the hon. Member’s comments, except to say simply that the legislation, in its entirety, aims to root out political violence, harassment and intimidation.

New clause 15 proposes to require candidates at UK parliamentary elections, in order to be validly nominated, to complete a declaration on whether they have received any income or gifts from foreign nations or connected entities. A registered political party would be responsible for ensuring that such a declaration had been completed before allowing a candidate to be nominated as a candidate for that party. The Government are strengthening the rules around political finance to protect against foreign interference and have introduced several measures, which we have discussed, that will apply to candidates. The reforms will make it significantly more difficult for malign actors to interfere in our elections.

As hon. Members know, and as I have said many times, the Rycroft review has recommended that the Government look further at enhancing rules for candidates to ensure that money received previously and then used in campaigns comes from permitted sources. The Government are carefully—and I underline that point—considering that recommendation, among all the others. The Government share the concern of the hon. Member for Hazel Grove but, in light of that ongoing work, I ask her not to move new clause 15.

New clause 16 seeks to require registered parties to produce an annual risk mitigation statement relating to donations originating from foreign nations, and to commission an annual independent investigation into donations that they receive from foreign-owned UK entities. Foreign money has no place in the UK’s political system. We recognise the hon. Member’s concerns that the nature of foreign interference is evolving, with threats becoming increasingly sophisticated. That is precisely why the Government have introduced a package of measures that work together to close potential loopholes and address vulnerabilities to foreign interference.

Via secondary legislation we will require donors to declare any benefits linked to their donations and we will strengthen donation rules to ensure that companies must demonstrate a genuine and substantive UK connection. Those changes will help to ensure that political donations genuinely reflect UK-based interests and will prevent the use of shell companies to channel impermissible donations. In practice, where behaviour is not already criminal, the new “know your donor” regime already addresses much of the issue that new clause 16 seeks to tackle. However, the new clause’s approach of annual risk mitigation statements and retrospective investigations of foreign nation donations is less proactive than the risk-based duty that the Bill introduces.

As a reminder, rather than relying on parties to report annually about what they consider appropriate, the “know your donor” regime introduces risk-based due diligence on significant donations across the electoral regime. For the first time, recipients of donations will be required to adopt a risk-based framework for assessing the permissibility of donors, supported by Electoral Commission guidance, which will set out how donees can mitigate potential risks. That means that anyone receiving significant donations, not just parties, must carry out risk assessments, ensuring that the system as a whole is strengthened.

Crucially, the “know your donor” regime has been designed to be proportionate and flexible in identifying a range of relevant risks. Imposing an additional set of statutory reporting requirements would be disproportionate and unnecessary. Those obligations would create additional financial and administrative pressures, particularly for smaller parties. We therefore do not consider these changes necessary. The Government’s proposals already deliver enhanced transparency and due diligence against foreign interference without imposing disproportionate burdens on parties or the regulator.

The purpose of new clause 17 is to prevent regulated donees from accepting any financial benefit from a proscribed foreign state broadcaster. It would also require a candidate for election to issue a declaration as to whether they had received any past or current financial benefits from a proscribed foreign state broadcaster.

The Government are working to improve political transparency and add tougher checks on donations, and we are acting to close loopholes by reinforcing electoral legislation against foreign interference. As already discussed, the Bill will require company donors to show that they have made sufficient revenue to fund their donations; that their company is headquartered in the UK or Ireland; and that they are majority owned or controlled by UK electors or citizens. That further reduces the risk of foreign state media providing remuneration to regulated donors.

The Government strongly believe that it would be contrary to the standards expected of public office holders for Members to try to leverage their office to earn additional income and gain experience for private gain. The House of Commons code of conduct has robust rules requiring MPs to declare any relevant interests they hold. As part of that, Members must declare any payment received over a value of £300, including its source. The rules also require Members to provide any contract of employment to the Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards upon request.

The Modernisation Committee is also working to drive up standards in public life and address matters of culture and procedure in the House of Commons. Appropriate safeguards are in place already to mitigate the risk of hostile states influencing UK politicians in this manner, and provisions in the Bill will further expand on that. I therefore ask the hon. Member for Hazel Grove not to press the new clause.

I turn to new clauses 38 and 39, tabled by the Opposition. The Government are clear that our new political finance system must have strong safeguards against undue foreign interference—we will prevent that. New clause 38 is not a targeted safeguard against foreign interference. It would exclude an entire category of people who are lawfully registered to vote under devolved franchise arrangements, including individuals who are resident in the UK and have substantial connections to our communities. It would decouple donor permissibility from electoral registration, and use devolved franchise provisions as a trigger for exclusion. That is not the right way to address this problem.

The independent Rycroft review’s recommendation in this space is clear: cap donations from overseas electors, as a targeted safeguard against foreign financial interference. The Government have acted decisively on that, and announced our intention to cap donations from overseas electors at £100,000 per year. That cap will be backdated to the date of the announcement so that it addresses the risks immediately. Our actions are direct, proportionate, clear and consistent with the principles of electoral law.

New clause 39 would require the Secretary of State to publish a consultation paper on options to enhance information sharing between relevant public bodies, agencies and political parties, to help identify and mitigate the risks of foreign interference in political donations within six months of the Bill receiving Royal Assent. The new clause would require the Government to consult on whether to act, but we are acting now with urgency and intent, as we committed to in our manifesto. The Bill puts in place new protections against foreign interference, and in designing them, we have already carefully considered what information needs to be shared, by whom and with whom, to ensure that these measures are effective in practice, without compromising security or public trust.

The Rycroft review also made a relevant recommendation in this space. It suggested not further legal duties but improved co-ordination between the Electoral Commission, the Government and the security services and police on sharing relevant threat information with parties. We will carefully consider that further, and we will issue a full Government response in due course. For those reasons, I invite the hon. Member for Hamble Valley not to push his new clauses to a vote.

I turn to new clauses 45 and 51, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Warwick and Leamington (Matt Western). New clause 45 would link the permissibility of donations to tax residency and having sufficient taxable funds or assets. As I have already outlined, the Government share the concern about the risks associated with political donations from overseas electors, which is why we acted following the independent Rycroft review.

The review considered the risks posed by overseas electors and recommended a clear, proportionate safeguard: an annual cap on the total value of donations that an overseas elector can make. It did not recommend a tax residency test or linking permissibility to taxable funds and assets, and there is a good reason for that: the applicability of tax law is complex and it can rightly be challenged, sometimes with long dispute resolution periods that follow. The risk of such action would be a high degree of uncertainty, and a high risk of inadvertent non-compliance by otherwise legitimate and responsible actors.

The Government have instead accepted Rycroft’s recommendation in full, and we are implementing a cap of £100,000 on donations from overseas electors—the low end of the range suggested. We believe that this strikes the right balance between ensuring the integrity of our system and allowing for legitimate participation. I hope I have reassured the Committee that the Government acknowledge the risk, and that we have taken targeted, proportionate and urgent action to address it.

New clause 51 seeks to require the Electoral Commission and National Crime Agency to produce and publish an annual report on the risks of foreign interference in political donations, and on the adequacy of existing systems to address those risks. The Government fully recognise the serious concerns about foreign interference in our democracy, and we share the intention to protect the integrity of the political finance system.

The commission and the NCA already have the freedom to publish reports, reviews and assessments on any theme within their responsibilities, as they judge appropriate. Both organisations take decisions on when and how to report based on operational need, emerging risks and the evidence available to them. We would not want to legislate a fixed annual requirement that could inadvertently restrict their ability to respond to other emerging issues that may demand more urgent or different forms of reporting.

For the Electoral Commission, the new clause would impose a new obligation in an area where the commission does not hold all relevant intelligence required to assess foreign interference threats. The commission already provides transparency on the political finance system within its statutory remit, but it is not a national security body, and it should not be mandated to publicly report on matters beyond its functions.

Our package of reforms already strengthens the electoral framework in a more effective and appropriate way. The new “know your donor” regime will require recipients of significant donations to undertake risk assessments on the origin of the funds, helping them to identify potential foreign or illicit influence at the point a donation is made.

I understand why the Minister is concerned about some of the new clauses, and as I said before, she is right that the Government are trying to tighten up the regime. On her argument that the Electoral Commission does not currently have the responsibilities she outlined, however, does she not agree that there is still a problem with two-way information sharing?

The Minister is absolutely correct to say that the Electoral Commission has the power to access Companies House information and powers under the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act 2023. However, if we look at past examples of registered Chinese Communist party spies giving money to political parties in this House, does she not think it would have been useful if the Labour party, in that case, had known about that via the security services and could have refused the donation? I am not sure whether the Government are filling the hole of two-way information sharing, and that concerns me.

I thank the hon. Gentleman for giving me a breather. As he knows, the Rycroft review considered this matter and—I mean this sincerely; it is not simply a form of words for the Committee —the Government are carefully considering those recommendations and will respond in due course. To give him that assurance: this is part of that consideration.

Alongside the measures I mentioned, enhanced company permissibility tests ensure that only organisations with a genuine and substantive UK connection can donate, closing off key vulnerabilities in our electoral framework. The Government are also committed to robust monitoring and evaluation of the Bill, and anticipate that this will include an impact evaluation assessing whether the policies introduced have achieved their intended aims.

We have discussed the Rycroft review, and I sincerely mean it when I say that we will respond fully in due course to all the measures in it, including on improved co-ordination between the Electoral Commission, the Government, the security services and the police. For those reasons, while I fully understand the commitment of my hon. Friend the Member for Warwick and Leamington to strengthening our defences against foreign interference, the Government do not consider this amendment to be the right mechanism to achieve that end.

I am grateful to all who have contributed. I plan to press to a vote all the new clauses that I have spoken to.

In the interests of ensuring that you call the right votes, Dame Siobhain, there is no doubt in my mind when the Minister says she is genuinely looking at trying to fix this problem—I believe her; she is a Minister of integrity and I know the Government absolutely want to achieve that aim—but this is happening now and, with no commitment to timescales, as the hon. Member for Hazel Grove asked for in relation to the Rycroft review, I am concerned that it will still be a problem.

I know the Minister will try to implement this carefully, but the lack of information sharing at this precise moment means that money is still being given, despite the fact that organisations that the Electoral Commission is not currently asking could provide that desperately needed clarity and transparency. Given the reassurance that the Minister has given to the Opposition on new clauses 38 and 39, however, I will not press them to a vote.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

New Clause 3

Permissible donors not to include persons who have promoted political violence

“(1) Section 54 of PPERA 2000 (permissible donors) is amended as follows.

(2) After subsection (3ZB) insert—

‘(3ZC) A person is not to be treated as a permissible donor in relation to a donation if the person has been convicted of a prescribed offence relating to the promotion, incitement, or use of political violence.

(3ZD) The Secretary of State must by regulations prescribe the offences which fall within subsection (3ZC).’” —(Lisa Smart.)

Brought up, and read the First time.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

New Clause 4

Donations in cryptoassets to political parties and candidates

“(1) PPERA 2000 is amended as set out in subsection (2).

(2) In Section 55 (payments etc. which are (or are not) to be treated as donations by permissible donors), at end insert—

‘(7) Any donation received by a registered party which is—

(a) made wholly or in part with cryptoassets; or

(b) accepted by means of a custodian wallet provider or cryptoasset exchange provider,

shall be regarded as a donation received by the party from a person who is not a permissible donor.

(8) Within three months of the coming into force of this section, the Electoral Commission must publish guidance in relation to the matters in subsection (7).

(9) In this section—

“Cryptoassets” has the meaning given by Regulation 14A(3)(a) of the Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and Transfer of Funds (Information on the Payer) Regulations 2017;

“Custodian wallet provider” has the meaning given by Section 131ZC (3) of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002;

“Cryptoasset exchange provider” has the meaning given by Section 131ZC (3) of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002.’

(3) RPA 1983 is amended as set out in subsection (4).

(4) In Schedule 2A, paragraph 6 (prohibition on accepting donations from impermissible donors), after subparagraph (3), insert—

‘(3A) Any relevant donation received by a candidate or their election agent which is—

(a) made wholly or in part with cryptoassets; or

(b) accepted by means of a custodian wallet provider or cryptoasset exchange provider,

shall be regarded as a donation received by a candidate or their election agent who is not a permissible donor.

(3B) Within three months of the coming into force of this section, the Commission must publish guidance in relation to the matters in subsection (3A).

(3C) In this section—

“Cryptoassets” has the meaning given by Regulation 14A(3)(a) of the Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and Transfer of Funds (Information on the Payer) Regulations 2017;

“Custodian wallet provider” has the meaning given by Section 131ZC (3) of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002;

“Cryptoasset exchange provider” has the meaning given by Section 131ZC (3) of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002.’”—(Dr Chowns.)

The purpose of this new clause is to prevent parties and candidates from accepting donations in cryptoassets, to reduce the risks of anonymous and impermissible donations.

Brought up, and read the First time.

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

New clause 12—Controls on accepting donations in form of cryptoassets—

“(1) The Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000 is amended in accordance with subsections (2) and (3).

(2) After section 54 (permissible donors to registered parties) insert—

‘54A Controls on accepting donations in form of cryptoassets

(1) A donation received by a registered party by way of a transfer of cryptoassets to the party must not be accepted by the party unless the donation meets requirements specified in regulations made by the Commission.

(2) For the purposes of this section, section 52(2)(a) (minimum donation to be disregarded) does not apply.

(3) Regulations made by the Commission may include requirements relating to—

(a) the identity of the holder of the cryptoassets donated to the registered party;

(b) the nationality and country of residence of the holder of the cryptoassets donated to the registered party;

(c) the value of a donation that is to be disregarded for the purposes of this section;

(d) the maximum value of the cryptoassets that may be donated to a registered party;

(e) the original source of the funds that were transferred into the cryptoassets donated to the registered party;

(f) any other matter that the Commission considers appropriate for the purpose of improving the transparency of donations made by way of a transfer of cryptoassets.

(4) In this section, “cryptoasset” means a cryptographically secured digital representation of value or contractual rights that uses a form of distributed ledger technology and can be transferred, stored or traded electronically.

(5) The Secretary of State may by regulations made by statutory instrument amend the definition of “cryptoasset” in subsection (4).

(6) A statutory instrument containing regulations under subsection (5) may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.’

(3) In Schedule 7 (controls on donations to individuals and members associations), after paragraph 6 insert—

‘6ZA Controls on accepting donations in form of cryptoassets

(1) A controlled donation received by a regulated donee by way of a transfer of cryptoassets to the donee must not be accepted by the donee unless the donation meets requirements specified in regulations made by the Commission.

(2) For the purposes of this paragraph, paragraph 4(3)(b) (minimum donation to be disregarded) does not apply.

(3) Regulations made by the Commission may include requirements relating to—

(a) the identity of the holder of the cryptoassets donated to the regulated donee;

(b) the nationality and country of residence of the holder of the cryptoassets donated to the regulated donee;

(c) the value of a donation that is to be disregarded for the purposes of this paragraph;

(d) the maximum value of the cryptoassets that may be donated to a regulated donee;

(e) the original source of the funds that were transferred into the cryptoassets donated to the regulated donee;

(f) any other matter that the Commission considers appropriate for the purpose of improving the transparency of donations made by way of a transfer of cryptoassets.

(4) In this paragraph, “cryptoasset” means a cryptographically secured digital representation of value or contractual rights that uses a form of distributed ledger technology and can be transferred, stored or traded electronically.

(5) The Secretary of State may by regulations made by statutory instrument amend the definition of “cryptoasset” in subsection (4).

(6) A statutory instrument containing regulations under sub-paragraph (5) may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.’

(4) In the Representation of the People Act 1983 in Schedule 2A (controls on donations to candidates), after paragraph 6 insert—

‘6A Controls on accepting donations in form of cryptoassets

(1) A relevant donation received by a candidate or his election agent by way of a transfer of cryptoassets must not be accepted unless the donation meets requirements specified in regulations made by the Commission.

(2) For the purposes of this paragraph, paragraph 4(2) (minimum donation to be disregarded) does not apply.

(3) Regulations made by the Commission may include requirements relating to—

(a) the identity of the holder of the cryptoassets donated to the candidate or agent;

(b) the nationality and country of residence of the holder of the cryptoassets donated to the candidate or agent;

(c) the value of a donation that is to be disregarded for the purposes of this paragraph;

(d) the maximum value of the cryptoassets that may be donated to a candidate or agent;

(e) the original source of the funds that were transferred into the cryptoassets donated to the candidate or agent (including information relating to any transactions between the original source of the funds and the transfer of those funds into the cryptoassets);

(f) any other matter that the Commission considers appropriate for the purpose of improving the transparency of donations made by way of a transfer of cryptoassets.

(4) In this section, “cryptoasset” means a cryptographically secured digital representation of value or contractual rights that uses a form of distributed ledger technology and can be transferred, stored or traded electronically.

(5) The Secretary of State may by regulations made by statutory instrument amend the definition of “cryptoasset” in subsection (4).

(6) A statutory instrument containing regulations under sub-paragraph (5) may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.’

(5) This section comes into force on the day on which this Act is passed (and section 80 is to be construed accordingly).”

This new clause introduces controls on donations made by way of transfers of cryptoassets. Donations or transfers would have to comply with requirements set out in regulations made by the Electoral Commission in order to be accepted and would be prohibited until the Commission has made such regulations.

New clause 20—Disclosure of past donations in cryptoassets—

“(1) Part 4 of PPERA 2000 (control of donations to registered parties and their members etc) is amended as follows.

(2) After section 66 (declaration by treasurer in donation report) insert—

‘66A Report on past donations involving cryptoassets

(1) The treasurer of a registered party must, within the period of six months beginning with the day on which this section comes into force, prepare a report under this section.

(2) The report must record the relevant details in relation to each donation received by the party during the relevant 5-year period which was—

(a) made wholly or in part with cryptoassets; or

(b) accepted by means of a custodian wallet provider or cryptoasset exchange provider.

(3) For the purposes of this section, the “relevant 5-year period” means the period of 5 years ending with the day on which this section comes into force.

(4) In this section, “the relevant details” in relation to a donation means—

(a) the name and address of the donor;

(b) the amount or value of the donation;

(c) the date on which the donation was received; and

(d) the date on which, and the way in which, any necessary steps were taken regarding the donation under section 56 (acceptance or return of donations: general).

(5) The report must be delivered to the Commission within the period of 14 days beginning with the end of the period mentioned in subsection (1).

(6) In this section—

“Cryptoassets” has the meaning given by Regulation 14A(3)(a) of the Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and Transfer of Funds (Information on the Payer) Regulations 2017;

“Custodian wallet provider” has the meaning given by Section 131ZC(3) of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002; “Cryptoasset exchange provider” has the meaning given by Section 131ZC(3) of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002.’”

This new clause amends PPERA 2000 to require registered political parties to compile and submit a one-off report to the Electoral Commission detailing the source, value, and dates of any donations made via cryptoassets, or accepted via crypto wallets/exchanges, over the past five years.

I rise to move new clause 4, tabled by the right hon. Member for Birmingham Hodge Hill and Solihull North (Liam Byrne). I will also speak briefly to new clause 12, tabled by the hon. Member for Warwick and Leamington, and new clause 20, tabled by the hon. Member for Hazel Grove. She is here and I am sure she will speak.

This incredibly important group of new clauses responds to a glaring absence in the Bill relating to crypto donations. As I will get on to, Rycroft has talked about this and the Government have committed to bringing forward related amendments. I am pleased about that, but it is very important that, in Committee, we take the opportunity to discuss in detail what shape those amendments might take and what the issues are around this topic.

There is consensus across wide parts of the political spectrum that cryptocurrency poses particular risks in relation to political donations. Transparency International has highlighted a number of factors: cryptocurrencies are fast and borderless, there are various exchanges offering anonymity and they are increasingly used for money laundering. There are clear risks with crypto, which makes it a high-risk vehicle for political donations through which foreign actors, who would otherwise be unable to, might be able to donate to political parties and candidates and try to influence British politics. Again, as Transparency International points out,

“it is reasonable to assume there is a strong likelihood that this alternative payment method is being used by hostile actors, such as Russia, to destabilise Western political systems.”

We need to take these warning very seriously.

Indeed, the Royal United Services Institute says:

“Cryptocurrency donations to UK political parties present an urgent and under-addressed challenge to the UK’s electoral integrity and, by extension, to its national security.”

It points out that

“the Bill does not mention cryptocurrencies”,

and says:

“This leaves a critical gap in our foreign interference defences as the pseudonymous, cross-border and decentralised features of crypto enable it to be used as a political money laundering accelerant”.

There are clearly many risks associated with crypto.

Philip Rycroft pointed this out himself and recommended:

“The government should legislate in the Representation of the People Bill to introduce a moratorium on political donations made in cryptoassets, with a power to end the moratorium only once Parliament and the Electoral Commission are assured that relevant regulation is effective.”

There is some debate about whether we should have a blanket ban on cryptoassets or a moratorium with safeguards.

I am mainly concerned about the outcome, rather than the particular terminology that is used to deal with this. We must ensure that crypto is not used as a vehicle for the pollution of British politics. One of the key issues is the use of AI to split donations into lots of tiny fragments that go under the radar of any benchmarks or limits, and of the scrutiny of donations. That is a risk, but as RUSI points out, the more significant, under-recognised and under-dealt with risk is the indirect use of crypto.

It is very easy to translate crypto into a fiat currency at the point of donation, so although I am moving new clause 4, tabled by the right hon. Member for Birmingham Hodge Hill and Solihull North (Liam Byrne), which would

“prevent parties and candidates from accepting donations in cryptoassets”,

we actually need a stronger regulatory environment and to recognise that there may be even bigger risks from the indirect use of crypto further down the chain, which could still be used to hide the provenance of funding, even though it may not be in the form of crypto when it enters the coffers of a political party or candidate.

The hon. Member is articulating very real concerns about cryptocurrency and the way it can manipulate our democratic processes. Will he join me in welcoming the fact that, when the Rycroft review was published before the Easter recess, the Government responded pretty swiftly on this, and particularly on a moratorium on political donations made through cryptocurrency. Does she welcome the Government’s urgent response in the Chamber?

It was clear from Ministers that they intend to get this right. The immediate response to the Rycroft review was about making sure that we get something in place straight away. From listening to Ministers inside and outside the Chamber, I know there is an enthusiasm to make sure this is done right. Does the hon. Member welcome that initial response and, like me, does she look to see how we can tighten up our defences against cryptocurrency in the longer term, however they may be used to try to infiltrate our democratic processes?

I welcome the commitment that the Government have made. I participated in that statement in the Chamber before Easter. As the hon. Member will have noticed, I even welcomed and congratulated the Government on their positive actions under the Bill without prompting from the Government Benches. It is important to give credit where it is due. It is also important to have the opportunity, in this Committee, to debate some of these details.

If the Government are to bring forward legislation to institute a moratorium, it is important to think about what conditions will be set under which any such moratorium might be lifted in future. That is crucial, because it could otherwise be overturned very easily. I suggest that, at a minimum, the criteria for lifting any such moratorium should be that an adequate regulatory environment is in place for controlling the ultimate risk and that there is triple positive approval from Parliament, the Electoral Commission and the Financial Conduct Authority—the three most important oversight organisations on this issue. It will be very difficult and complex to find a mechanism to regulate cryptocurrency; I hope that we just get rid of it from our politics completely. But if the Government are going to introduce a moratorium, the conditions under which that moratorium might be lifted must be included in the primary legislation that puts it in place.

The hon. Lady is making an excellent speech. I agree with every word she says about there being a very fine balance between a moratorium and a ban—a ban could, actually, be retrograde—but if we have a moratorium we should at least have a regulatory framework that makes sure that cryptocurrency cannot be moved upstream. Does she share my concern that, despite the good intentions of the Minister and the Government, and despite consistent pushing for a timescale for the implementation of the Rycroft review, we have not had that? She is therefore right that the Committee is the perfect opportunity to get the ideas of all political parties, and to hopefully get a better idea of the Government response.

I share the hon. Member’s enthusiasm and sense of urgency about getting Rycroft implemented as soon as possible. In the spirit of giving credit where it is due, the Government did commission that review—which was good—the review was quite fast, there was an immediate statement, and the Bill is going through. I do not think that we are in a perfect place.

I would have liked the Bill to have longer in Committee to give the Government a chance to introduce amendments that we could properly scrutinise. It is deeply unfortunate that, for a Bill that is about the workings of our electoral system, we are not able to do that core scrutiny in Committee—the crucial line-by-line scrutiny in the Commons, which is the elected Chamber. We are being asked, basically, to take it on trust. It is not that I distrust Government, but it is important to have this discussion now. I hope that the Minister will respond to those points.

I have made the point about the importance of including in primary legislation the criteria under which any moratorium might be lifted in the future, and that there must be really strong safeguards. I have also made the point that a ban on crypto donations will not itself stop the risk, because of the downstream issues. We have to think carefully about how whatever mechanism is introduced deals with that.

We have already seen that Ben Delo, who has given £4.5 million to Reform in recent months, has said, “Oh dear, since I am going to be hit by this retrospective moratorium I am going to move back to the UK to evade it.” That is clear evidence of gaming the system by a guy who, by the way, was convicted in the US of impropriety in relation to political financing. He was subsequently pardoned by Donald Trump. We have to be really careful of how bad actors might manipulate any legislative proposals that are introduced.

A ban on cryptocurrency will not, in itself, stop the risks. We also need a cap on all political donations—we will discuss a group of new clauses relating to that in a bit, so I will save my arguments on that topic until then—plus a donor register, as I spoke about in Tuesday’s sitting. A donor register with donor registration numbers would address the issue of traceability and address the risk that donations are split into many tiny donations to hide the fact that they are all from the same place. Having to have a donor registration number that is associated with a particular, identified, allowable donor would go a long way to addressing that problem. I look forward to hearing from the Minister.

I am happy to be speaking in support of new clause 4, and in favour of new clauses 12 and 20. New clause 20, which is in my name, would require parties to declare cryptoasset donations that they have received in the past. I agree with pretty much everything that the hon. Member for North Herefordshire said, and I note my earlier comments about the sticky wicket on which the Minister is being asked to play.

The Government’s statement on the publication of the Rycroft review was a rare moment in which they nailed both the timing and politics of an issue, and it was absolutely right to ban crypto from that day to stop any further gaming of the system. However, I completely agree with the hon. Member that this Committee is the place to have a conversation about what that will look like. Future Government amendments will be tabled at a later, as of yet unspecified date. I believe that the Minister is working with officials on the issue, but this Committee is where we can talk about the Bill on a cross-party basis.

The Rycroft review recommended that a moratorium be placed on political donations made in cryptoassets. The Government responded to the review on the date of its publication, but, although other amendments to the Bill have been tabled, there has not yet been a clear indication of how quickly that recommendation will be integrated into it. The Liberal Democrats look forward to getting some further detail, dates and quick action, but we also want the measures introduced in this Bill to be effective in the long term.

Cryptoassets are extremely difficult to trace. The difficulty in tracing the ultimate ownership of cryptoassets, the proliferation of different kinds of cryptoassets and the advent of AI-assisted technologies that can break cryptoassets into small amounts, below any threshold at which donations may have to be declared, create serious risks for political finance transparency. There is also a real risk of cryptoassets being used as a vehicle to channel foreign money into the UK political system, and neither the Electoral Commission nor political parties currently have the capability and expertise to manage that risk adequately. New clause 20 would require parties to declare the cryptoasset donations that they have received in the past. Given the clear issues with crypto donations, the public should surely expect transparency on them.

On new clause 12, tabled by the hon. Member for Warwick and Leamington, the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy examined the merits and risks of allowing crypto donations, noting that benefits include the potential for greater transparency in some cases, and for regulations to gradually institutionalise alternative forms of payments. However, the Committee concluded:

“Crypto donations pose an unnecessary and unacceptably high risk to the integrity of the political finance system and public trust in it. We accept that future regulations may institutionalise the use of alternative payment systems for use in donations. At present, however, the opportunity to evade rules is too high, the adequacy of mitigations too low, and the resource cost of attempting to implement acceptable oversight is disproportionate. We see no democratic imperative to permit the use of crypto in political finance until adequate safeguards are in place.”

Crypto also poses wider upstream risks to the integrity of political finance, with the Committee report going on to say that

“donors can convert ‘dirty’ foreign crypto funds into ‘clean’ UK fiat and then donate it without arousing much suspicion. A ‘last mile’ ban on crypto donations is therefore not a panacea. Specialist capabilities to address upstream risks are underpowered and require further work.”

New clause 12 therefore calls for an immediate moratorium on crypto donations until the Electoral Commission produces statutory guidance, which should be made using the affirmative procedure to ensure that Parliament has the opportunity to review its adequacy before it is accepted. That guidance could include measures regarding the donor’s identity and location, the original source of funds and maximum limits on the amount of crypto that may be donated.

It is also worth mentioning that, as we have seen in the press in the last couple of weeks, a leader of a UK political party has been promoting the use of cryptoassets and has gained financially from doing so. We should all spend a moment to reflect on why somebody would want to do that, particularly when cryptoassets are not risk-free. Promoting their use, and the use of gold bars as an investment tool, should be beyond what is acceptable for an elected Member of this House. I encourage anybody, particularly people who purport to lead a political party in this country, to really think about the impact of their actions, particularly when it is for financial gain. On that basis, I commend new clauses 12 and 20 to the Committee.

I will touch very briefly on the new clauses that have been tabled. I thank RUSI for the report that the hon. Member for North Herefordshire outlined. I had a meeting with RUSI yesterday, and the fact that it was able to even start to break the ice of my understanding of cryptocurrency and the regulatory framework that is needed was a miracle. It has done a lot of work on this issue, and I congratulate it on coming up with quite sensible proposals and information that goes into detail about the benefits of a ban versus a moratorium.

It is very easy in this House to ban things, but we do not want a ban that creates a worse problem by moving that cryptocurrency upstream. Therefore, as the official Opposition we welcome the idea that there should be a moratorium. We also welcome the fact that the Government implemented an immediate ban pending a review. If a moratorium goes ahead, we need to make sure that an adequate regulatory framework is implemented to prevent some of the exploitative measures that the hon. Member for Hazel Grove outlined in her excellent contribution.

As the hon. Member for North Herefordshire outlined, we are discussing in this Bill Committee probably the most important aspect of the integrity of the electoral process. There are plenty of others in that competition, but the most important aspect of that is foreign interference and donations, including cryptocurrency donations. We are being asked to give the Government our trust—and I do trust the Minister—that these changes are going to happen very soon. The hon. Member is absolutely correct to say that this is the most intense part of the parliamentary process. At the moment, we are being asked to debate new clauses put forward by Opposition parties. We are relying on the Government to give these matters just as much importance, yet they have not given that timescale.

I am torn on new clause 4. I understand the intention of the hon. Member for Warwick and Leamington, but at the moment my feeling is that new clause 4 is really not worth agreeing to. That is because of the evidence given to me by RUSI, which shows that preventing parties and candidates from accepting donations in cryptoassets does not solve the issue of those cryptoassets getting through to candidates and parties, or interested parties, later down the line.

The briefing that was given to me by RUSI about the potential drawbacks of a ban mean that I am not satisfied that new clause 4 would do anything at this precise moment. I rose to speak because I want to sincerely give the official Opposition’s commitment to assist if the Minister wants to engage on a cross-party basis. That has my contention at other stages of the Bill Committee—we stand ready to assist on a cross-party basis to really speed up the passage of elements of the Bill, including on this matter. I would never speak on behalf of other parties, but I am sure that stands for them as well.

As the hon. Gentleman is mentioning other parties and as I represent one of those other parties, it is only appropriate that I stand up and agree with him wholeheartedly. Everybody in the Chamber and beyond wants us to get this issue right. It is not a party political point. As the hon. Gentleman is, I and we are ready to work cross-party to get it right. If that means us doing some extra work between the various stages of the Bill, I would be completely content to be part of that.

I thank both hon. Members. Who would have thought that I could get some agreement from the Liberal Democrats and the Green party? I entirely welcome it: they are absolutely correct. This is not a party political matter; it is a genuine attempt to fill the void that the Government have created through the lack of a timetable for ensuring that we tackle this issue.

The Minister is correct to say that this is a really complicated issue, so we must get it right in this legislation. Electoral reform legislation usually comes before the House only every decade and if we do not get it right, we will allow malign influences into the political process. I hope that the Minister takes that seriously. We stand ready, between stages of the Bill, to have a meeting on a cross-party basis, perhaps through the Parliamentary Parties Panel. The Opposition think that a moratorium is better than a ban, but the right regulatory framework has to be in place. We stand ready to assist.

New clause 4 seeks to make donations made to a registered political party, candidate or agent impermissible if the donation is made wholly or in part with cryptoassets.

New clause 12 purports to take a power so that the Secretary of State may make regulations, drafted by the Electoral Commission, mandating various requirements relating to the political donation of cryptoassets. It seeks to establish that political donations made via cryptoassets would be deemed impermissible unless those regulations were met. It intends to create an effective moratorium on cryptoasset donations until those regulations would be in force. On 25 March, the Secretary of State published the report of the independent review by Sir Philip Rycroft—sorry, I keep knighting him.

It is only a matter of time.

As Members know, we have accepted the review’s recommendation for a moratorium on the use of cryptoassets as political donations in order to safeguard the integrity of our political finance system from foreign interference, and we have been clear that the Government will bring forward their own amendment on this important matter in due course. In doing so, we will work closely with the Electoral Commission to ensure that our proposals are robust and provide sufficient protection for our democracy.

The hon. Member for North Herefordshire asked when the moratorium would end. We intend for it to end once the Electoral Commission and Parliament are confident that the regulatory environment around cryptoassets is robust enough to protect the integrity of our political finance system from foreign interference. I have noted her comment about the FCA. For those reasons, I ask that the hon. Member withdraw her new clause.

New clause 20 would require registered political parties to compile and submit a one-off report to the Electoral Commission detailing donations received by the party made in cryptoassets for the last five years. We agree that cryptoassets present a significant risk, different from other forms of donation. In line with the recommendations from Rycroft, the Secretary of State has announced the moratorium, which we will bring forward in an amendment to the Bill. I recognise that that amendment would result in the Electoral Commission examining donations already made via cryptoassets before the moratorium was in place.

We are reducing the risk going forward, but I should highlight that there have already been some safeguards in place with regards to donations made with cryptoassets before the moratorium. Both existing law and guidance from the Electoral Commission are clear that that the rules and regulations for political donations made in fiat currency also apply to donations made via cryptoassets. It is an offence to attempt to evade the rules on donations by concealing information, giving false information or facilitating an impermissible donation. It would be an offence to cash in cryptocurrency and then use the resulting funds to make a donation, if that were knowingly done to conceal or disguise a donation from an impermissible donor. As such, it is an offence to attempt to evade the rules on donations.

Guidance from the Electoral Commission also makes it clear that recipients must be alert to donors appearing to circumvent permissibility rules, such as by making multiple donations beneath reporting thresholds. I also highlight the fact that the Electoral Commission already has existing investigatory and enforcement powers when there are grounds to suspect illegal activity, including the power to request information or required documentation.

Finally, I want to address the point made by the hon. Member for Hamble Valley, and all other Members who have offered to work on a cross-party basis—if only the hon. Member replied to my letters!

He did. I invited him to come and talk to me about the Bill; other Members received their letters and came.

Putting that to one side—I am being slightly flippant—this has been a very fast-moving environment, and policy has been formulated very quickly in response to Rycroft. I undertake to work collaboratively with the hon. Member for Hamble Valley and Members of all parties as we go forward with the Bill—this is not the end of its passage.

I note the comment made by the hon. Member for North Herefordshire about having a longer Committee stage, but I am mindful that the implementation of other areas of policy needs to continue—so that we can, for example, introduce votes at 16 in time for the next general election. Although we want to go longer, we also want to go quicker. We will work collaboratively as we go forward.

I think the Minister is being slightly sneaky, dare I suggest: she did write to me about having meetings, but there were no proposals in the Bill on cryptocurrency and there still are not. Therefore, that issue was perhaps not within the remit of the legislation. When it came to other aspects of the Bill, I presumed that we would have gone through the usual channels and passages in Committee. The Minister is absolutely right that we did not meet, but that did not include the issue of cryptocurrency in this legislation.

However, had the hon. Gentleman come along, he would have had the opportunity to raise anything he wanted to discuss, as other Members did— I am always happy to meet the hon. Gentleman.

Given the assurances I have provided, particularly that the Government intend to table an amendment on the moratorium period for cryptocurrencies, I hope the hon. Member for North Herefordshire will consider withdrawing her new clause.

I tabled the new clause as a probing amendment, and I recognise that the Government have stated their intention to bring other amendments forward. I look forward to engaging constructively with the Government, not necessarily just in formal settings, on the specifics of the issues and concerns I raise. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 6

Overseas electors: postal ballots

“(1) RPA 1985 is amended as follows.

(2) After section (12) insert—

‘12A Overseas electors: postal ballots

(1) The Secretary of State must, by regulation, make provision regarding the casting of postal ballots by overseas electors.

(2) Any regulations made under subsection (1) must provide for overseas electors to be offered the ability—

(a) to request an electronic version of their ballot paper for elections to print using the elector’s own printing facilities; and

(b) in a relevant country, to return their completed ballot paper to a United Kingdom embassy, High Commission or consulate for onward delivery to the relevant returning officer by diplomatic mail to be counted.

(3) For the purposes of this section, “a relevant country” is one where the United Kingdom maintains an embassy, Hight Commission or consulate.

(4) Regulations made under subsection (1) may amend provision made by or under any other Act as necessary.

5) Any regulations made under this section must not be made unless a draft has been laid before and approved by resolution of each House of Parliament.’”— (Zöe Franklin.)

Brought up, and read the First time.

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

New clause 7—Overseas electors: information on voter registration by the UK Passport Office

“The Secretary of State must, within six months of the passing of this Act, lay before Parliament a report containing proposals to require the UK Passport Office to provide information on voter registration to United Kingdom residents overseas when they—

(a) apply for a passport; or

(b) apply to renew their passport.”

New clause 8—Overseas electors: Review of feasibility of proposals for facilitating overseas ballots

“(1) Within six months of the passing of this Act, the Secretary of State must publish and lay before both Houses of Parliament a report on proposals for facilitating overseas electors to vote in parliamentary elections.

(2) The report must consider the feasibility of proposals for—

(a) the use of United Kingdom Embassies, High Commissions or consulates as if they were a polling station asset out in Schedule 1 of RPA1983;

(b) the digital transmission and printing of ballot papers;

(c) voting by telephone;

(d) secure electronic voting;

(e) changes to deadlines and practices as set out in Schedule 1 of RPA1983 to enable earlier despatch of ballots for overseas voters;

(f) informing overseas voters on early registration and voting options;

(g) extended proxy voting arrangements for overseas voters; and

(h) any other measures to improve the speed, accuracy and security of voting by overseas electors as the Secretary of State believes appropriate.

(3) In preparing the report, the Secretary of State must consult—

(a) overseas electors;

(b) electoral administrators;

(c) His Majesty’s Diplomatic Service; and

(d) such other persons as the Secretary of State believe appropriate.

(4) For the purpose of this section, an ‘overseas elector’ is a person who fulfils the requirements for an overseas elector in section 1 (extension of parliamentary franchise) of the RPA 1985.”

This new clause would require the Secretary of State to conduct feasibility studies on proposals to improve overseas voting, as recommended by the Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Select Committee’s Second Report of Session 2024-6, Review of the 2024 general election.

New clause 42—Overseas electors: reform to voting process

“(1) The Secretary of State, must, by regulations, make provision to enable overseas voters to vote in person at a United Kingdom Embassy, High Commission or consulate at United Kingdom parliamentary elections.

(2) For the purpose of this section, an ‘overseas elector’ is a person who fulfils the requirements for an overseas elector in section 1 (extension of parliamentary franchise) of the RPA 1985.

(3) Regulations made under subsection (1) may amend provision made by or under any other Act as necessary.

(4) Any regulations made under this section must not be made unless a draft has been laid before and approved by resolution of each House of Parliament.”

This new clause would require the Secretary of State make provision by regulations so that overseas electors can vote in person at United Kingdom embassies, consulates and high commissions for United Kingdom parliamentary elections.

New clause 43—Electoral Register: British Nationals Abroad

“(1) The Secretary of State may, by regulations, introduce a system to give overseas electors the option to register to vote when they renew their British passport online.

(2) Any regulations made under subsection (1) must be made under the affirmative procedure.”

This new clause would allow the Secretary of State to regulate to introduce a system to allow overseas electors the ability to register to vote when they renew their passport online.

Amendment 3, in clause 80, page 100, line 35, at end insert—

“(ha) section (Overseas electors: Review of feasibility of proposals for facilitating overseas ballots)”

This amendment is consequential on NC8.

New clause 6, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Newton Abbot (Martin Wrigley), picks up on the 2024 voting reforms that expanded eligibility for around 1.4 million to 3.4 million people—yet of those individuals, only 191,000 overseas voters are registered. I suggest that that is not a lack of interest in democracy, but a failure of the system to make voting workable for those living abroad. What that means practically is that the UK is now near the bottom internationally for how effectively it enables our overseas citizens to vote.

One of the core problems is postal voting, as it does not work reliably for those living overseas. According to the Electoral Commission, only 52% of overseas postal ballots arrive in time to be counted. Following conversations between my hon. Friend the Member for Newton Abbot and other organisations—we took evidence on this during the Committee evidence sessions—it is clear that overseas voters are seeking practical changes that would enable them to reliably cast their votes securely and more easily and reliably. The proposed new clause sets out methods for doing so, including secure downloading and printing of ballots and returning ballots to embassies and consulates. It is worth noting that such a system is already used in the Netherlands, New Zealand and Spain.

I turn to new clause 7. Another part of the problem for overseas voters is that they are simply not aware that they can register to vote or of how they can do so. One option, discussed in the Committee evidence sessions, is to provide an opportunity at the passport renewal and application stage, when they could be given this information. When a UK citizen applies for or renews a passport, they already provide proof of identity, their overseas address and their last UK address: everything needed for voter registration.

Voters should be simply prompted and given the option to register at that point. My hon. Friend the Member for Newton Abbot is not suggesting that they should be automatically registered, but given that the Bill seeks to roll out automatic voter registration and my hon. Friend has posed the question to the Government, providing an automatic moment to tell people they can register to vote and how to do so would be within the scope of the Bill and an opportunity the Bill could take.

I move on to new clause 8, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Henley and Thame (Freddie van Mierlo). New clause 8 and the associated amendment 3, which is consequential on the new clause and also tabled by my hon. Friend, would require the Secretary of State to conduct feasibility studies on improving overseas voting, as recommended by the Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee’s Second Report of Session 2024–25 and its review of the general election. With over 3.5 million British citizens abroad eligible to vote, it is important for the Government to use this Bill as an opportunity to break down barriers to voting so that citizens can be fairly represented.

In the last general election, fewer citizens abroad were registered to vote than in 2019, in spite of an historic expansion of eligibility to vote following the scrapping of the 10-year rule. I have already outlined in my comments on the new clause tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Newton Abbot that ballots can end up arriving too late for overseas citizens to be able to cast their votes, and proxies can be problematic to arrange if they no longer have contacts here in the UK to cast votes for them.

It is estimated that only 25% of citizens abroad know their rights and that they can vote, and only 48% of postal votes were returned; of course, the number varies slightly depending on which organisation we reference. I have already outlined that there are other countries with systems in place that enable their citizens overseas to cast their vote in an easier, secure and reliable way.

So far it appears the Government have been unwilling to take the steps necessary to make things easier for overseas voters. The new clauses are designed to ensure that the Government take steps to investigate how to make overseas voting easier for our constituents. Can the Minister outline whether the Government will support any of the new clauses in the name of my colleagues? If not, can she outline how the Government intend to ensure that overseas voters are able to cast their ballot in a safe, secure and reliable way?

Thank you very much for your nod of assent, Dame Siobhain, and to the Clerk.

This group of new clauses are integral to the Bill. The Liberal Democrat spokesperson, the hon. Member for Guildford, said they relate to one of the holes in this legislation. As I outlined earlier, electoral reform legislation generally comes to this House probably once every decade, and that is why we should treat it as important and use it to try to right some of the wrongs or deficiencies within our electoral system.

We seriously believe that the rights of overseas voters are important. Let us cast our minds back to what seems like an age ago, when we had the evidence sessions of this Bill Committee. Each of our respective political parties, including the governing party, has honourable volunteers trying to advocate the rights of voters living abroad. At the moment, there is no attempt from the Government to try to right some of the wrongs and include overseas voters in our democratic process as they should be.

New clause 43 is similar to the proposals put forward by the hon. Member for Guildford in new clause 8. It would allow the Secretary of State to regulate to introduce a system to grant overseas electors the ability to register to vote when they renew their passports. New clause 42 would require the Secretary of State to make provision by regulations so that overseas electors can vote in person at United Kingdom embassies, consulates and high commissions for United Kingdom parliamentary elections. We believe that those are proportionate and sensible measures to include some overseas voters.

I understand there may be an intervention that says, “What if people cannot get to consulates or embassies?” We believe new clause 42 would be the first step to ensure a full review of the overseas elector system. We understand that some people could be excluded because of geography, but we believe that it would be a step towards increasing the low engagement rate that we have seen in past elections.

On new clause 43, there is a democratic deficit with overseas voters. We think it should be made easier to register to vote as an overseas elector. Therefore, when people renew their passports, we believe that the new gov.uk one-stop-shop website that the Government set up—I used it the other day—would be a perfect online tool for that. That would help the participation rate of overseas electors, which, as the hon. Member for Guildford said, is notoriously low and something we all want to improve.

The Elections Act introduced a series of measures to support British citizens living overseas. That included votes for life, by removing the previous 15-year cap on being registered. However, the Electoral Commission’s evaluation of the 2024 general election found a series of practical obstacles in the way of overseas voters—we heard from them at the evidence session—especially for those who live a long way away and may be unable to send their postal votes back in time.

Only 52% of overseas postal ballots were returned in time to be counted, and the return rate in Australia was a mere 6%, as evidenced in the Electoral Commission’s report on the 2024 UK general election. That is nothing less than tangible disenfranchisement, and that needs to be corrected.

In new clause 8, the hon. Member for Guildford is trying to do that by establishing at least a feasibility study on how we do that. This is very similar to discussions with regard to cryptocurrency; by using those organisations that gave evidence, every party can feed into the review and the feasibility study. That is perfectly admirable, but I argue that that is a longer-term thing. Our new clauses 42 and 43 would bring in practicable steps now to engage that participatory process. As I say, we perfectly accept that it would not solve every issue, but it would include those participation rates.

I regret that the Government seem to have abdicated their responsibility over a vast area of people who should be voting but are not able to. I do not think that is done willingly—it may have been by mistake—but they have not done enough. In fact, I do not think they are doing anything on it in this legislation. I hope the Minister will look favourably on new clause 8 as well as new clauses 42 and 43, which would take very quick action to ensure that people near embassies are able to register their vote, so that those participation rates increase.

It is not true that the Government do not have an eagerness to resolve issues for overseas voters. They are legitimate voters who should be able to exercise their right to vote without unnecessary barriers, and we recognise the difficulties that they face in trying to participate. Many choose to vote by post, and improvements are being made in the Bill to the postal voting system, which should be beneficial to overseas voters.

The purpose of new clause 6 is to allow for overseas electors to print their own ballot paper. They would then be able to deliver their completed ballot to the relevant consulate, embassy or high commission, to then be delivered to the relevant returning officers via diplomatic mail. That process could allow overseas ballot papers to be posted earlier and reduce the chance that they arrive too late to be counted.

I have already put forward a range of measures in the Bill to improve the resilience and responsiveness of the postal voting system, including changes to deadlines to allow swifter printing and delivery of postal vote packs. The Government welcome suggestions on further improvements that we could make to our postal voting system, but unfortunately we cannot support this new clause. All ballot papers must be uniformly printed and contain security markings to ensure the secrecy of the ballot and prevent fraud. It would not be possible to replicate that consistently if ballot papers were printed on home printers.

New clause 7 relates to using engagement with the UK Passport Office as a means of encouraging UK citizens living overseas to register to vote. It would require the Secretary of State to lay a report before Parliament within six months of the passing of the Bill. The report would cover proposals requiring the UK Passport Office to provide UK citizens living overseas with information on voter registration for UK elections when they apply for a passport or renew their passport.

The Government are committed to improving electoral registration and are actively exploring ways to do so. We intend to explore and test a range of new, automated approaches that make better use of data and make the process easier and quicker for citizens. Separately to the Bill, we are exploring making better use of data that eligible citizens are already providing for other services, and helping to encourage people to register, vote or update their entries on the register. Our focus is on delivering on automated registration approaches, including those set out in the Bill, which allow us to improve voter registration for a greater range of electors.

The purpose of new clause 8 and amendment 3 is to require the Secretary of State to publish a report assessing a range of options to support postal voting for overseas electors. We always welcome feedback and new ideas about how we can improve any aspect of our electoral system, and I welcome the interest of the hon. Member for Guildford in this topic. As we have said, the Government recognise the challenges for those who live in remote areas overseas. However, I am afraid I do not believe that the costs of drafting and publishing this report could be justified.

Many of the proposals are frequently suggested and have been thoroughly considered already. Though it is possible that they could support the timely delivery of postal votes, they may come with considerable risks. For example, the use of online or telephone voting, or the digital transmission of ballot papers, would create unacceptable risks to the security and secrecy of those ballots. I note that the Bill already contains a number of measures specifically aimed at tackling those issues and improving the resilience and reliability of the postal voting system.

In particular, on the suggestion set out in subsection 2(e) of the new clause—that we should review deadlines and practices relating to the dispatching of postal ballots—the Government have already conducted a review on precisely that matter. The Bill will make a number of changes to improve the system, such as bringing forward the postal vote application deadline and formalising a postal vote determination date. I hope that Members will welcome and support those changes.

I now turn to new clauses 42 and 43 tabled by the Opposition. The purpose of new clause 42 is to require the Secretary of State to make a provision to enable overseas voters to vote in person at UK embassies, high commissions or consulates for parliamentary elections. The Government have considered the suggestion and feel it would be a significant logistical undertaking that would not yield sufficient benefits to overseas electors.

For example, embassies could need to run polling stations covering all 650 constituencies, and every returning officer would need to oversee the activity in every embassy. Each embassy would need to be equipped with all the relevant ballot papers, registers and other materials needed—and could need up to 650 variations of these. Any benefits of embassy voting would be limited to electors living close to diplomatic premises, and it is therefore difficult to justify the additional costs that would arise from the suggestion.

We have no plans to introduce such a system of voting. Instead, we are focused on improving the current systems for overseas electors—such as postal and proxy voting—so that they remain secure, reliable and accessible for everyone. There are a number of measures on postal and proxy voting in the Bill, and I hope Members will be supportive of them.

New clause 43 would introduce a power for the Secretary of State to make regulations to introduce a system to give overseas electors the option to register to vote when they renew their British passport online. The Government are committed to improving electoral registration and are actively exploring ways to do so. There are already existing powers that will allow us to explore and test a range of more automated approaches that involve integrating registering to vote with government services. They will make the process of voter registration easier and quicker for citizens. Our focus is on more automated registration methods that will benefit a greater range of electors.

I thank the Minister for her comments, but I sadly remain unconvinced that we are addressing the significant problems that overseas voters are encountering when they seek to be involved with our democracy. They may live overseas, but they are still British citizens and deserve to be able to cast their vote. I will not press new clauses 6 and 7, in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Newton Abbot, to a Division. However, I intend to press new clause 8 to a Division, if that is feasible, Dame Siobhain.

I beg to ask leave to withdraw to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 8

Overseas electors: Review of feasibility of proposals for facilitating overseas ballots

“(1) Within six months of the passing of this Act, the Secretary of State must publish and lay before both Houses of Parliament a report on proposals for facilitating overseas electors to vote in parliamentary elections.

(2) The report must consider the feasibility of proposals for—

(a) the use of United Kingdom Embassies, High Commissions or consulates as if they were a polling station asset out in Schedule 1 of RPA1983;

(b) the digital transmission and printing of ballot papers;

(c) voting by telephone;

(d) secure electronic voting;

(e) changes to deadlines and practices as set out in Schedule 1 of RPA1983 to enable earlier despatch of ballots for overseas voters;

(f) informing overseas voters on early registration and voting options;

(g) extended proxy voting arrangements for overseas voters; and

(h) any other measures to improve the speed, accuracy and security of voting by overseas electors as the Secretary of State believes appropriate.

(3) In preparing the report, the Secretary of State must consult—

(a) overseas electors;

(b) electoral administrators;

(c) His Majesty’s Diplomatic Service; and

(d) such other persons as the Secretary of State believe appropriate.

(4) For the purpose of this section, an “overseas elector” is a person who fulfils the requirements for an overseas elector in section 1 (extension of parliamentary franchise) of the RPA 1985.”.—(Zöe Franklin.)

This new clause would require the Secretary of State to conduct feasibility studies on proposals to improve overseas voting, as recommended by the Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Select Committee’s Second Report of Session 2024-6, Review of the 2024 general election.

Brought up, and read the First time.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

New Clause 15

Declaration of income or gifts from Foreign Governments

“(1) Schedule 1 to RPA 1983 (parliamentary elections rules) is amended as follows.

(2) After rule 8 (consent to nomination) insert—

“Declaration of income or gifts from Foreign Governments

8A (1) A person is not validly nominated unless the person makes a declaration stating whether they have received in the past or are currently in receipt of any income or gifts from—

(a) the government of any foreign nation, or

(b) any person or organisation connected to the government of any foreign nation.

(2) The declaration must be—

(a) in the prescribed form,

(b) signed by the person, and

(c) delivered at the place and within the time for the delivery of nomination papers.

(3) For the purposes of this rule, a person or organisation connected to the government of any foreign nation mean anyone who has at anytime been—

(a) a member of, or

(b) a politically-appointed adviser to a foreign administration.”

(3) In rule 6A (nomination papers: name of registered political party), at the end insert—

“(4) A registered political party is under a duty to ensure that a candidate has made the declaration required by rule 8A, and a certificate under paragraph (1) or (1B) may not be issued by or on behalf of the registered nominating officer of the party in respect of a candidate unless this duty has been discharged.””.—(Zöe Franklin.)

This new clause would require candidates to declare any income or gifts from foreign nations or connected entities in order to be validly nominated. It also places a duty on political parties to ensure their candidates have made this declaration before authorising them to stand on behalf of the party.

Brought up, and read the First time.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Deirdre Costigan.)

Adjourned till this day at Two o’clock.