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Lord Mandelson Humble Address: Government Response

Volume 856: debated on Tuesday 2 June 2026

Statement

The following Statement was made in the House of Commons on Monday 1 June.

“With permission, I would like to update the House on the Government’s response to the humble Address of 4 February. Before I do, I think it is important for all of us to reflect again on the impact that this debate will have on the victims of Jeffrey Epstein. Members across the House will be aware of the truly horrific crimes that he committed against countless women and girls; we hold them in our thoughts when discussing these issues again today.

The Government have today laid the second tranche of documents. These were laid before the House in advance of this Statement and are now on GOV.UK for the public to see. The documents we are publishing today comprise one of the largest government publications ever laid before the House. This disclosure process has been wide-ranging, costing the Cabinet Office alone over £1 million. As the House knows, this was an official-led process, with judgments made by senior officials, and I am grateful for the careful work that they have undertaken right up until today’s publication.

While the first tranche dealt with Peter Mandelson’s appointment, withdrawal and severance, this second tranche responds to the parts of the Motion that requested communications and documents concerning his appointment and vetting, as well as messages between Peter Mandelson and Ministers, special advisers and civil servants in the months prior to, and throughout the duration of, his appointment.

I recognise that the House will need sufficient time to review today’s tranche in full, given the size of the publication. As we have just heard from the Leader of the House, that is why I have secured government time on Wednesday for a subsequent general debate: so that there is an opportunity for Members to ask further questions after today’s Statement. To inform that debate, and for clarity and accountability, I draw the House’s attention to the methodology set out in the publication today, which explains in detail how the Government undertook the disclosure process. I will not repeat that in full here today, but I will make reference to a number of areas that I know the House has expressed an interest in previously.

First, on redactions, in line with the Motion, over 300 individual documents were referred under a process agreed between the Government and the Intelligence and Security Committee. I confirm that no material has been redacted on the grounds of prejudice to national security or international relations without the committee’s approval. For clarity, all redacted material agreed with the ISC is labelled in the bundles today with three asterisks. Outside this arrangement, this process does not change the important and well-established constitutional principle that national security and international relations judgments are ultimately for the Government. I once again express my thanks to the Intelligence and Security Committee for its engagement in this process. Further limited redactions have been made outside the ISC process in respect of information that relates to junior officials’ names; contact details such as telephone numbers and email addresses; the personal or commercially sensitive data of third parties not relevant to the Motion; and, where relevant, legal professional privilege.

I also confirm that no redactions have been made to references to Global Counsel, other than to protect the identity of individuals who worked there and are not public figures. Officials have sought to be transparent in the material where the individual is a Global Counsel employee. Also, no redactions have been made to references to Palantir and Anduril outside the scope of the existing ISC redactions process, and no clear references to current or former UK politicians have been redacted on the basis of their being third parties.

I can also confirm to the House that no Government Minister or special adviser has determined any of the redactions themselves. The redaction process has been overseen by Cabinet Office officials and, where relevant, in agreement with the ISC. In addition, the Cabinet Office humble Address team have taken advice from an independent King’s Counsel—this has included review of the methodological approach followed by officials—and acted on that advice to inform their work. This has helped to ensure that the Government are confident that their approach is compliant with the humble Address and the Government’s legal obligations.

These additional targeted redactions, made outside the agreed ISC process, have been made in line with the Freedom of Information Act 2000, the Ministerial Code, and the resolutions on ministerial accountability passed by both Houses in 1997. This is important because it goes to the question of whether the Government have complied fully with the humble Address. That question should be answered in the context of the established rules and precedents that relate to humble Addresses. If these rules were not relevant, the humble Address would have required extensive additional detail on the face of the Motion dealing with these procedural issues. However, I recognise the level of interest in the House in respect of these redactions not related to national security and international relations, so, on the recommendation of the ISC, I can confirm that the honourable Member for North Dorset, Simon Hoare, the chair of the Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee, has reviewed our approach to third-party redactions this morning. He has confirmed that we have applied the methodology set out in the document and that, in his view, the redactions are sensible, reasonable and proportionate. I thank the ISC for this recommendation and the honourable Member for the additional reassurance he has provided on this point.

As the House is aware, the Metropolitan Police has also asked the Government to withhold some material in scope of the Motion that it considered could be prejudicial to its ongoing criminal investigation or any subsequent prosecution. This request remains in place and I am very grateful, again, to the chair of the Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee, with whom we have also shared this information in order to provide additional accountability for the Government’s actions. I hope that Members will appreciate the need not to prejudice the investigation and understand that I will not be able to answer questions about certain documents that have been withheld. No responsible Government would wish to undermine a criminal investigation and put at risk the justice that it seeks, and I am sure that the House will share this position. I can, however, confirm that this material does include questions put to Peter Mandelson by the Prime Minister’s then chief of staff, and Peter Mandelson’s responses.

In addition, a small number of documents have been withheld at the request of the police, which fall broadly into the following categories: national security vetting material; conflict of interest process material; and relevant internal correspondence with Peter Mandelson. Such information will, of course, be published at the conclusion of the investigation or at the point at which it would no longer be prejudicial to the police investigation to do so.

The documents published in the first and second tranches contain the entirety of the documents the Government have available for disclosure, except those few documents I have just referred to in relation to the Metropolitan Police. Members will no doubt have questions about what might be perceived to be ‘missing’ messages and meeting notes, which I would like to address in turn. On messages that some might expect to be included, I can confirm that we have conducted multiple rounds of discovery from relevant Ministers, special advisers and officials, in line with the Motion passed by the House. This has involved requesting searches of email, messaging platforms such as WhatsApp, and other related communications services on both work and personal devices.

However, the House should note that some messages may not have been backed up where devices may have been changed or disappearing messages turned on, for reasonable and permitted reasons, including before the dismissal of Peter Mandelson or the passing of the humble Address—my messages included. I do recall having some limited exchanges with Peter Mandelson over WhatsApp, including those I have already discussed in the media, but these conversations did not involve transacting government business and were in line with official guidance on the use of non-corporate communications channels at the time.

I share the view put by the Intelligence and Security Committee to the House that there are lessons for the Civil Service to learn in respect of better note-keeping, archiving and the use of appropriate levels of secure IT systems in the future. The Government have already committed to a review of the use of non-corporate communications channels, the terms of reference for which we will shortly publish, taking into account the concerns that have been raised in this House and the two tranches of documents that we have published in response to the humble Address. I will of course keep the House updated as we progress that work.

I now turn to the material relating to Peter Mandelson’s national security vetting process. I can confirm that the vetting process summary and recommendation that was put by UK Security Vetting officials to the Foreign Office has been shared with the Intelligence and Security Committee. It was shared for the purpose of agreeing redactions, as part of the agreed process, so that it can be published when we are in a position to do so. What have not been shared are the highly sensitive personal data inputs collected during the interview process. These could relate to, for example, how much money an individual might have in a particular account or who a person may have had a personal relationship with in the past. If those participating in the vetting process cannot trust that the information they feed into that process is confidential, that will harm the integrity of the whole system. Anything less than full candour would be hugely damaging and profoundly negative for our national security; this would be felt by this and future Governments and, ultimately, by the British people. Sharing this data for any person undergoing developed vetting would therefore undermine the very basis of our national security vetting system.

This is the 10th update that I have provided to the House on this matter. With the exception of the small number of documents that are withheld at the request of the police, which we intend to publish when the police are content for us to do so, the Government now consider that they have duly discharged the duties set out in the humble Address. I will, however, return to the House for the general debate on Wednesday to provide a further opportunity for colleagues to ask questions. On that basis, I commend this Statement to the House”.

My Lords, this scandal began with the Prime Minister’s decision to appoint Peter Mandelson as His Majesty’s ambassador to Washington. Mandelson is a man whose relationship with Jeffrey Epstein was already known to be a profound reputational risk and whose later published record included cash payments and benefits from Epstein, including travel.

At the core of this story is not merely a failure of process; it is a failure of judgment. It is the Prime Minister’s failure, and it shows a callous disregard for the victims of one of the most notorious sex offenders of modern times.

In truth, we have learned little that is surprising from what is actually in these documents. It is no surprise that Lord Mandelson displayed contempt for the Prime Minister, for cabinet government and for officials and advisers alike, despite his public utterances. He described No. 10 as “beleaguered and bereft”, said it needed a “complete revamp” and claimed that senior people in Downing Street did not know what the Prime Minister wanted; indeed, that most of them did not think that the Prime Minister knew what he wanted.

Of equal concern is that, clearly, Ministers spent a lot of time discussing party politics with a supposedly politically impartial official. Can the Minister confirm that that failure to uphold the impartiality of the Civil Service is in contravention of the Ministerial Code?

What is most revealing is not what the documents contain; it is what they do not contain. Nowhere is there candid written submission, whether from officials or political advisers, saying, “Prime Minister, this appointment is unwise. This candidate carries unacceptable reputational risk. This office demands a higher standard”. We have not been shown a written decision from the Prime Minister or the Foreign Secretary authorising the appointment on the merits. Instead, we are given peripheral documents: process, risk, choreography, vetting, and announcement handling. One chain says simply that

“a political appointment has been agreed”.

The Cabinet Secretary later records that earlier advice explained the Prime Minister’s right to

“make such an appointment and the process for doing so but did not give specific advice on candidates”.

So, for all the Prime Minister’s talk of leadership, the record before us suggests that not one person serving him felt able or willing to advise him candidly in writing that this appointment was folly. That is a remarkable indictment of the culture at the centre of government.

It is also deeply ironic. This is a Prime Minister who has staked much of his moral authority on the Hillsborough law and a statutory duty of candour. He has said that such a duty is needed so that the truth is not optional and cover-ups are impossible and that the law would change the balance of power so that the state can never hide from the people it should serve. Those are admirable sentiments. They arise from hard and bitter experience: Hillsborough, infected blood, Covid—all where families were forced to fight the state, not only for justice but for records, evidence and truth.

Perhaps the one person in government who did, in private, take the duty of candour seriously was Pat McFadden, who told Lord Mandelson:

“Every meeting I have is: ‘Who can we tax in order to pay benefits to others?’ They’re asking the wrong questions”.

What a shame that he felt that that duty did not extend to the electorate.

Does the Minister appreciate how surreal it is for a Government to preach candour in public office while, in relation to one of the gravest scandals in British diplomatic history, they appear assiduously to have avoided creating clear records of advice and decision? Candour is not merely what Ministers say at a Dispatch Box after the event. Candour is what advisers write down when the powerful are about to make a grave mistake.

There is a further problem. The Government acknowledge that material has been withheld so as not to prejudice an ongoing Metropolitan Police investigation, and say that further publication may follow. But where is the schedule? How many relevant documents have been withheld? What categories do they fall into? Who authored them? What dates do they cover? What broad subjects do they concern? I ask the noble Baroness to undertake that the Government will provide the House with a clear account of what has been withheld and why.

Finally, responsibility cannot be outsourced to officials, advisers or process. The responsibility lies with the Prime Minister. If further confirmation were needed of Lord Mandelson’s total unsuitability, it is found in the extraordinary discovery that after his appointment had been publicly announced, he still planned to participate in UBS’s Greater China Conference in Shanghai in his Global Counsel capacity, and that he would be paid for it. Officials further recorded that he asked to start on the FCDO payroll in order to facilitate that private engagement. This was a man with no proper regard for propriety, ethics or the dignity of public office, and he has been driven from office and from public life. The remaining question is how long the Prime Minister who appointed him can credibly remain.

My Lords, when discussing such matters we should always start with remembering and honouring the bravery of the women and girls who came forward to tell the truth, revealing the grim reality of the behaviour they and others had been subject to. Their commitment to truth stands in stark contrast, sadly, with Peter Mandelson’s decision to withhold key information from the papers we are discussing today.

However, turning to what we do have, and starting on a positive note, the Government’s new guidance on direct ministerial appointments published alongside the humble Address now says—and it is very welcome:

“Where security vetting procedures are necessary, these should be undertaken and completed before an appointment is confirmed and announced”.

I have raised before the rather bizarre, back-to-front nature of appointing somebody first and only then checking whether they are suitable, so that is a very welcome change and should be acknowledged as such.

On a possibly less positive note, I see that the terms of reference for the vetting review have also been published alongside this tranche of documents. I have previously expressed concerns about how the results of Peter Mandelson’s vetting were reported to others through a daisy chain of verbal briefings, such that in the end the Prime Minister was hearing the outcome of the vetting process third hand, without sight of the relevant outcome documents. Whatever we think about the judgments made in that process, that is clearly a very brittle process, prone to error and lack of accountability. Can the Minister therefore confirm that the vetting review will include not just how vetting is done, which is clearly within scope, but how its results are reported to others, including looking at the merits of replacing that culture of verbal briefings with a clear, documented paper trail?

Moving on to what is definitely not, I am afraid, a positive note, the messages that we now can see from inside government show a clear and widespread embedding of the culture of government by WhatsApp. I have previously asked about the promised review of the Cabinet Office’s guidance on the use of WhatsApp, which still, at the bottom of the page on GOV.UK, states:

“This guidance will be reviewed on or before 31 December 2025”.

Last month, when I queried when the review will be completed, the Minister told me:

“I expect it to be before your Lordships’ House imminently for us to discuss the detail”.—[Official Report, 19/5/26; cols. 280-81.]

However, yesterday, in the House of Commons, the Minister, Darren Jones, told the House simply that the terms of reference for the review will be published “very shortly”. So we have gone from a promised review before 31 December 2025, to an expectation last month that details were imminent, to a hope yesterday that the terms of the review will be published very shortly. It seems that each time, as time passes, we are getting further away from the completion of the review. What assurances can the Minister give us about the Government’s commitment to sorting this issue out and ensuring that this review is fully completed —and promptly?

Turning to the papers themselves, I have four questions. Running through much of the correspondence is the idea from officials that membership of the House of Lords exempts you from vetting requirements in many circumstances. It is a repeatedly expressed belief. Given the limited nature of the checks made on those of us who have the privilege of joining this House, and given that those checks have in many cases been carried out several decades previously, can the Minister confirm the Government’s position? On what occasions, and for which posts, would someone who otherwise has to be vetted be exempted from vetting by virtue of being a Member of this House?

Secondly, there is the email from a civil servant to Peter Mandelson on 21 January last year—volume 1, page 77—regarding the vetting team’s request for the names of his foreign contacts. The email said:

“I suggest you send over the handful of names you mentioned, even though you don’t consider them ‘close contacts’. That will reassure the vetting team that you’ve been comprehensive, even if it’s all quite artificial”.

That apparent coaching on how to mislead the vetting team with extraneous information is clearly concerning. Can the Minister tell us when the Government became aware of such exchanges, and what action has been taken to ensure that similar such coaching or advice is not proffered in future?

Thirdly, there is the curious email from Ailsa Terry to Peter Mandelson and Morgan McSweeney on 13 February last year—volume 1, page 386. It says:

“Olly has been clear about the need to delete all traffic on this”.

Why would a senior civil servant be telling those two people to delete all the records of something?

Finally, I turn to a matter of detail—it would be a useful one to clear up—regarding volume 3, page 128. It appears to show the noble Lord, Lord Livermore, arranging a meeting with a paid lobbyist, yet the Treasury’s list of declared such meetings does not have any matching entry. Did that meeting take place? If so, who attended it, and what is the reason for that meeting not appearing in the register?

I appreciate that, obviously, the Minister may not be able to give detailed answers to all those points now, but I hope she will be able to commit at least to writing to me, because clarity and transparency are crucial as part of not just the Government’s but the whole political system’s reaction to the scandal we have been facing.

My Lords, first, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, and the noble Lord, Lord Pack, for their contributions. As ever, I will endeavour to answer all their questions, but I will reflect on Hansard and write on any issues I have missed.

Before I do so, it is important for all of us to reflect on the impact this debate will yet again have on the victims of Jeffrey Epstein. Noble Lords across your Lordships’ House will be aware of the truly horrific crimes he committed against countless women and girls. As we discuss these issues again today, it is the victims of a horrendous sexual predator whom we must remember.

Moving on to the substance and process of the Government’s compliance with the ISC, for clarity and accountability, as noble Lords will have seen, the publication includes a summary of the methodology explaining how government officials undertook the disclosure process. To clarify, because doing so will be helpful for Members of your Lordships’ House, on redactions, in line with the Motion, more than 300 individual documents were referred under a process agreed between the Government and the Intelligence and Security Committee. The Government are grateful to the committee for its engagement in this process, and I am of course especially grateful to my noble friend Lord Beamish for his stewardship of the ISC and his management of this significant additional workload.

Further limited redactions have been made outside the ISC process in respect of information that relates to junior officials’ names, contact details, the personal or commercially sensitive data of third parties not relevant to the Motion and, where relevant, legal professional privilege. The Cabinet Office humble Address team, which has taken the decisions on non-ISC redactions, has taken advice from an independent KC—including reviewing the methodological approach—and officials, acting on that to inform its work. These additional targeted redactions made outside the ISC process have been made in line with precedent, built on the conventions of the Freedom of Information Act, the Ministerial Code and resolutions on ministerial accountability passed by both Houses in 1997, as my right honourable friend the Chief Secretary to the Prime Minister stated yesterday.

On the ISC’s recommendation—we thank it for such a constructive suggestion—the chair of the Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee, Mr Simon Hoare MP, has reviewed our approach to third-party redactions and confirmed that we have applied the methodology set out in the document and that the redactions are sensible, reasonable and proportionate. As noble Lords will be aware, the Metropolitan Police Service has asked us to withhold some material in scope of the Motion which it considers could be prejudicial to its ongoing criminal investigation or any subsequent prosecution.

To ensure parliamentary oversight, the Government also shared this information with the chair of the Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee to provide additional accountability of the Government’s actions. The Government are very grateful to Mr Hoare for his participation in that exercise. Our goal is to ensure that we neither prejudice nor undermine any police investigations, as all Members of your Lordships’ House would expect. Such information will be published at the conclusion of the investigation, or at a point when it would no longer be prejudicial to the police investigation to do so. Therefore, I am limited in what I can and will say.

I will also touch briefly on the material relating to Peter Mandelson’s national security vetting process. The UK security vetting process summary and recommendation that was put to the Foreign Office has been shared with the ISC to agree reactions so that it can be published when we are able to do so. What has not been shared is the highly sensitive personal data that formed the basis of the vetting process. If those participating in the vetting process cannot trust that the information they feed into the process is confidential, it will harm the integrity of the whole system, undermining the very basis of our national security vetting system and, in turn, our national security. We cannot and will not do that. I note that the chair of the ISC, my noble friend Lord Beamish, confirmed last night that he agrees with the Government that the larger vetting detail should not be released to the committee even though it is covered by the humble Address. I am grateful to my noble friend for saying so.

Moving to the specific points that have been raised, the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, touched on compliance with the Ministerial Code. Noble Lords will understand that I am not the judge of the Ministerial Code—that is the role of the Prime Minister, taking advice from his independent adviser as needed. As set out in the code, Ministers are personally responsible for deciding how to act and conduct themselves in light of the code, and for justifying their actions to Parliament and the public. The noble Baroness also touched on the future duty of candour law and raised the scandals that have led to us requiring a law. We have discussed in your Lordships’ House many times—be it the horrors of the infected blood scandal, of Horizon, of Windrush, of Hillsborough, or of the Manchester Arena—that there is a reason why we need to change the law. If we cannot convince people to be candid, then in order to change the culture we will need to change the law. I reassure the noble Baroness that, as I understand it, Peter Mandelson did not participate in the Shanghai speaking engagement she referenced.

On the direct ministerial guidance and change in vetting, the noble Lord, Lord Pack, raised a very important point, as he did last time, about how this is communicated. I will have to go back to officials to see if it can be included in the terms of reference, because the process is well under way. The noble Lord is aware that my colleague, the Chief Secretary to the Prime Minister, was called up on the fact that it has been slightly delayed, although it is slightly ambitious timing, so it depends on your view. However, I will see what I can do about verbal briefings and write to the noble Lord.

On the issue of the NCCCs review, I expect very shortly—imminently—to be back in front of your Lordships’ House with both the terms of reference and who is undertaking that review. We are not not doing it; we absolutely are, as my honourable friend in the other place said. But I will have to come back to him.

With regard to the fit and proper person test, the noble Lord would have read with interest, as I did, about what we are allowed to know as Members of your Lordships’ House and what we are not allowed to know. Noble Lords will be aware that there are a small number of exemptions from standard vetting requirements in place. Sir Adrian Fulford is considering the relevant policies as part of his review into national security vetting. His high-level recommendations will be published shortly, and we will act swiftly on his recommendations.

There is a general exemption from national security vetting for parliamentarians. This has been a general rule for many years, and many Members of your Lordships’ House would have experienced briefings because of it. That includes in this instance and in others those briefings that can also be made on Privy Council terms, hence the discussion. I would suggest that noble Lords actually look at the time stamps for how that discussion was done, because that was a one-day discussion—several messages but a one-day discussion—and then a decision was made.

The noble Lord, Lord Pack, also asked me about my noble friend Lord Livermore and the transparency declaration. I understand this was a personal meeting that took place away from government property. The only participants were my noble friend Lord Livermore and Peter Mandelson; no one else from Global Counsel joined in the end. As this was a meeting in a personal capacity, it was not recorded as an official meeting.

The documents before your Lordships amount to one of the largest government publications ever laid before the House. Officials work tirelessly to ensure our compliance with the wishes of the other place and over £1 million has been spent. The scale is not dissimilar to the requirements of a public inquiry, and I want to thank my officials for their extraordinary effort since the beginning of February. However, the last word should not be about process or political intrigue, but to remember who has been failed. Our thoughts must remain with the victims of Epstein today and every day.

My Lords, one figure emerges from these papers with his already high reputation enhanced. I refer of course to Sir Olly Robbins, the former Permanent Secretary at the FCDO, and I am sure the noble Baroness, who is an excellent Minister, will agree with me that the memo that he authored towards Lord Mandelson, which was published, reinforces that he is a public servant of the highest standards of honour and integrity. Would she also agree with me that he should be reinstated now rather than have the taxpayer pay hundreds of thousands of pounds for his unfair dismissal?

My Lords, Olly Robbins was dismissed because the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary lost confidence in him, as has been set out publicly before. As has always been the case, we do not comment on individual employment cases.

My Lords, the ISC has spent many hours and days doing the task which Parliament set it. I put on record my thanks, on behalf of the committee, to the staff who have worked behind the scenes on this. I also thank the committee members, including two Members of our own House, my noble friend Admiral Lord West, and the noble Baroness, Lady Brown of Cambridge, who have worked very hard on this long task.

I wrote last week to the Prime Minister raising four points: the use of WhatsApp in government; the use of low-side systems for transmitting confidential and secretive information; the lack of record-keeping, particularly within the Foreign Office, of audit trails; and the way in which security advice was handled by officials and Ministers. They are nothing new. The committee raised them with the last Government, including the Foreign Office, which had a very bad reputation for keeping records or WhatsApp messages. I understand that the Government have now committed to a review of this, but I say to my noble friend that there is an urgency in this. This needs to be done very quickly, because this is not something new. It was raised with the last Government, it was ignored by the last Government, and it now needs to be put right as a matter of urgency.

I thank my noble friend for the work he has done, as well as my other noble friend and other colleagues in your Lordships’ House and the other place. This has been an extraordinary volume of work for many people, not least members of the committee and their officials, and we are very grateful to them for it.

I will take the four points he raised in turn. He is absolutely right; there has to be a positive in everything that happens, and one of the positives is that we will now review each of these areas to fix what is not working, the first of which is the use of WhatsApp. There will be a review on the use of non-corporate communication channels—we really need a better phrase for them than NCCCs, but I am sure we will come up with one. On record-keeping, I assure your Lordships’ House that the Cabinet Secretary has this week written to all the heads of departments—in other words, to every other Permanent Secretary—to remind them of their responsibilities, and we are reviewing the guidance that is issued to private offices going forward. My noble friend is absolutely right about low-level platforms and security information, and those two will be taken in train. I realise, as I reference that, that one of the questions asked by the noble Lord, Lord Pack, was about why some material should be deleted. I am not sure of the detail, because I have not seen some of the security elements behind it, but I would suggest that it may be because that information should not have been on that level of platform.

My Lords, I say to the Minister that I greatly welcome the fact that the Government are going to resist any misplaced pressure to reveal full security vetting, as indeed the ISC rightly says. We all know that, in references for jobs nowadays, the candidates are perfect and have a million and one qualities. I know that security vetting is very detailed— I have been subjected to it many times myself. It goes to your school, education, employers and friends, and people speak frankly. If for one moment they felt it was going to be published, security vetting designed to protect the most secret information would be of little value. Whatever else we do, we must hold on to that. However tempting it would be, for whatever reason, to know the full contents, they must not be revealed. I am talking not about this case but about a general principle. I very much welcome the Minister’s assurance on that.

I could not agree more with the noble Baroness. This is clear, and there is already some concern about the chilling effect that even discussions of vetting in this way may be having on people’s responsibilities to be candid during the process, because they are concerned that it could end up that very private details of their personal life could be released in a way that most people do not know about. It is absolutely clear that this Government will not release the vetting files, in order to protect our national security.

The Minister has been making a very good meal of this, and I pay tribute to her. I am going to America next week; does she share my deep embarrassment that this country, renowned for its integrity, appointed this shocking man as ambassador?

I wish the noble Lord safe travels, and I hope he has a very enjoyable visit. With regard to the appointment, I think we have all been clear that this was a mistake and should not have happened, and the Prime Minister has taken personal responsibility for it.

My Lords, does the Minister agree that the last, albeit inadvertent, public service that Peter Mandelson delivered was to enable to be laid bare for public scrutiny the extraordinary vacuum at the centre of this Government—that there is a lack of leadership and a lack of direction, and that this has consequences? Does she agree that, when the Financial Secretary stood at that Dispatch Box yesterday and told the House that the inevitable consequence of the Government’s so-called EU reset was that Britain would rejoin the European Union, that has consequences? Does she agree that that lack of discipline and of collective responsibility has to come to an end and can only do so with a change of Prime Minister?

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, because he has given me an opportunity to highlight exactly how effective my Government and that of Keir Starmer have been since we came into office. More than 50% of asylum hotels are closed and knife crime has gone down by 10% in the last 12 months. The IMF has just raised our growth forecast. We have approved 110,000 grants to help people buy new electric vehicles, and we have increased the number of secondary school, special school and further education teachers by 4,000. Over 1,300 schools have joined the free breakfast club programme. The NHS waiting list is at its lowest level for three and a half years. Some 11 million renters have stronger rights and 56,000 illegal immigrants have been returned to their countries. We have brought in 30 hours of free childcare per week for parents and the minimum wage has gone up. I will take that every day of the week.

My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend the Minister for the way in which she is addressing this Statement. Seeing her pile of papers and the number of Post-it notes attached, it is clearly an impressive task for any Minister to deal with.

Much has been made of the use of WhatsApp. I suspect I am not alone in your Lordships’ House in confessing that I use WhatsApp. I also have a number of conversations in which disappearing messages are used. There has already been criticism of the use of disappearing messages in WhatsApp, not just in the discussions that have been revealed as part of this but right through the previous Government, particularly during the Covid period. Perhaps my noble friend can confirm that.

Secondly, while I deplore the use of WhatsApp for any formal decision-making, disappearing messages are an entirely sensible proposition where WhatsApp is being used. I checked my mobile phone this morning, and the largest use of memory on it is by WhatsApp—so, in fact, for colleagues in the other place, colleagues here and colleagues on the other side of this Chamber to use disappearing messages is entirely rational. Does my noble friend agree?

I thank my noble friend and would like to reassure him that I have read every page of the humble Address. I apparently do not need to sleep any more.

The point that he made about WhatsApp and disappearing messages is absolutely right. The guidance issued to every Minister is clear:

“‘Disappearing message’ functions have a role in limiting the build up of messages on devices. You must ensure that any such use does not impact on your recordkeeping or transparency responsibilities”.

Anyone who had deleted messages was not breaking the rules. The issue is in making sure that all record-keeping of decisions and how they were made is kept in government, which is why we are reminding every government department of its responsibilities in this space.

My Lords, as my noble friend Lady Finn said, the Prime Minister has staked his moral authority on the Hillsborough law and the duty of candour. That is admirable but, when candour is required of this Government, we get redacted documents, nil responses and stolen mobile phones, which we are told were not backed up in the cloud. We learned today that even the Prime Minister has disappearing messages on WhatsApp switched on—so much for the state never hiding from the people it serves.

My question for the Minister is: where is the candour from this Government? Spare us the usual list of the previous Government’s sins; after all the Prime Minister’s moral grandstanding on this issue, the argument that “We’re no worse than you lot” does not really cut it.

I wish the noble Lord had listened to the answer I gave to my noble friend because, if he had, he would not have needed to read his question. With regard to the issues that the noble Lord raised, I do not think he will find that I have attacked the previous Government from this Dispatch Box, although there is plenty to attack them for.

On candour, as I just stated to my noble friend, the use of WhatsApp messages and deleting messages is explicitly allowed for within the guidance that is issued within government. On the use of candour, I think everyone benefits from a little light.

My Lords, it is interesting that my noble friend does not talk about the previous Government, but they were the Government who tried to prorogue Parliament and found that they should not have done it. I find it difficult to take lessons from them.

My noble friend and other Ministers have acknowledged many times that there were serious shortcomings in the due diligence and vetting process, and they have already made some changes—for example, to ensure that vetting takes place before an announcement. I welcome that. My noble friend alluded to various changes under way, but I wonder whether she could let us know what other workstreams will make sure that we improve the whole situation with vetting and approvals.

I thank my noble friend for her question. I agree with her that there is a little bit of chutzpah in being lectured at by colleagues opposite.

With regard to the changes that are being undertaken, obviously we have asked specialists in the field to make their recommendations to us. Noble Lords who operate in the security field will be aware that there is always an ongoing review of how vetting is undertaken to make sure that it complies with the world as the world shifts and changes and as our threat levels change. I look forward to seeing Sir Adrian Fulford’s recommendations for next steps. My noble friend is absolutely right that we are not standing still. We have reminded all government departments of their responsibilities. We are looking at the existing guidance for private offices to make sure that ministerial guidance is in place. One of the things that I am looking at is the recommendation of the noble Lord, Lord Redwood, about how we can ensure that Ministers have the right support in place, as well as the right training and mentoring, both in this space and more broadly.

My Lords, Ministers have brilliant private offices that help them with record-keeping, so the Minister is right to suggest that using WhatsApp is perfectly acceptable. I want to understand further, though. It is unfortunate that the chief of staff’s mobile phone was stolen. Has the Cabinet Office investigated asking network carriers, and indeed the WhatsApp organisation, for the metadata? That records whatever calls were made, whatever texts were sent and which messages were deleted. It would be useful, in this level of candour, to make those requests and to inform Parliament if the network carriers, and indeed WhatsApp, refuse to provide them.

I have to agree with the noble Baroness about brilliant private offices; mine is fabulous. Obviously, it has a really easy job of making sure that I operate well. On the specifics about the metadata, I will have to write to the noble Baroness. This was a process led by Cabinet Office officials. I am not sure of the detail in that space on what additional information they sought.

My Lords, it is clear that Members opposite were hoping that there would be a silver bullet in all these humble Address papers that would kill the Prime Minister. When they have to resort to quoting Peter Mandelson’s view of the Prime Minister, it shows how desperate they are becoming. Then we got the scattergun approach from the noble Baroness, Lady Finn. She had to resort to picking here, there and everywhere and getting nowhere.

My question relates to what the noble Lord, Lord Pack, said about vetting Members of this House. As the Minister said, that does not happen at the moment. Yet we have a Member of this House who was appointed against the views of the intelligence community: the noble Lord, Lord Lebedev. Surely the Minister must agree that we may need to rethink it in view of that.

I thank my noble friend, as always, for his thoughtful contribution. With regard to the specifics, there is a genuine issue. Obviously, many Members of your Lordships’ House on a day-to-day basis need to be briefed on specific pieces of government legislation or to have early access to certain documents, as was offered to some Members of your Lordships’ House yesterday, on Privy Council terms or as fit and proper people. There is a balance here about how we operate our day-to-day world so that noble Lords can appropriately scrutinise the actions of the Government versus general access to information. While I will not comment on individual Members of your Lordships’ House, I can understand some concerns, which is why Sir Adrian Fulford has been asked to consider that as part of his review.

My Lords, it appears from the second tranche of emails that the former ambassador to America was sent on a mission to support, and ensure that the American Administration supported, the appalling Chagos deal. It also appears that there was more to it than that in relation to his involvement with the Chagos deal, not just making sure that the American Administration went along with the UK Government. Will the Minister please inform the House whether there is an investigation to give us further information as to the precise role that the former ambassador to America had in relation to the Chagos deal?

My Lords, I find the question itself a tad surreal, given the nature of what we are talking about. The noble Baroness is referencing the actions and engagement that the Government’s ambassador had with another nation. Some of that material will be redacted for international relations and national security reasons. With regard to where we currently stand, the base on Diego Garcia is vital to our national security. Our agreement with Mauritius is the best way to secure it, ensuring that it can continue to operate effectively and play a crucial role in our national security.

My Lords, does the Minister agreed with me that we should not take lessons from the Opposition, who had a Prime Minister who misled Parliament on a number of occasions and none of them said anything about it?

My Lords, I do not believe that the noble Lord was referring to any Member of your Lordships’ House in those comments; I say this to reassure the Privy Council Bench on the opposite side.

Noble Lords will appreciate that the previous Government had some challenges at various points during their period in office. As for what that means for us, we have republished the Ministerial Code, adding in the Nolan principles. We have created the Ethics and Integrity Commission. We have made sure that we are bringing forward consideration on lobbying reform. This is a Government who are seeking to rebuild trust in public life, and we will continue to do so.